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Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill are not
yet conclusively identified, significant attention has focused on the
safety-related policies and practices-often referred to as the safety
culture-of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. This
Article defines and characterizesthe economic and policy forces that
affect safety culture and identifies reasons why those forces may or
may not be adequate or effective from the public's perspective. Two
potential justifications for policy intervention are that: (1) not all of
the social costs of a spill may be internalized by a firm; and (2) there
may be principal-agentproblems within the firm, which could be
reduced by external monitoring. The Article discusses five policies
that could increase safety culture and monitoring: liability,
financial responsibility (a requirement that a firm's assets exceed a
threshold), government oversight, mandatory private insurance,and
risk-based drilling fees. We find that although each policy has a
positive effect on safety culture, there are important differences and
interactions that must be considered. In particular,the latter three
policies provide external monitoring. Furthermore, raising liability
caps without mandating insurance or raising financial
responsibility requirements could have a small effect on the safety
culture of small firms that would declare bankruptcy in the event of
a large spill. The Article concludes with policy recommendations for
promoting stronger safety culture in offshore drilling; our preferred
approach would be to set a liability cap for each well equal to the
worst-case social costs of a spill and to require insurance up to the
cap.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are not
yet conclusively identified, significant attention has focused on the
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safety-related policies and practices-often referred to as the safety
culture-of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. The
magnitude of the spill has stirred public interest in ensuring that the
safety culture of these firms, and of the offshore drilling industry
generally, is appropriate given their high-risk activities. This Article
defines and characterizes the economic and policy forces that affect
safety culture and identifies reasons why those forces may or may not
be adequate or effective from the public's perspective. We conclude by
offering policy recommendations designed to improve safety culture in
the industry.
Following the Deepwater Horizon spill, organizations, analysts,
and policymakers have advanced a wide range of proposals that aim to
reduce the likelihood of a future catastrophe. Many proposals would
mandate the use of specific technologies and engineering practices,
such as requiring more extensive testing of blowout preventers and
designing wells to have a minimum number of barriers. 1 Some
proposals also address the system level, such as requiring a safety
case that would demonstrate to the regulator that the entire system
meets a particular level of safety.2 Even more broadly, some analysts
and observers have suggested that a stronger safety culture-particularly on the part of BP but also other firms-might have
prevented the spill and would reduce the likelihood of future spills.
For example, it was allegedly acceptable at BP to increase the risk of a
spill in order to reduce costs. Representative Joe Barton stated, "Our
hearings discovered that significant cost-cutting measures resulted in
decreased maintenance and inspections of the pipeline, and BP's
management culture deterred individuals from raising safety
concerns." 3 The University of California, Berkeley Deepwater Horizon
Study Group concluded, "Cost cutting, failure to invest, and
4
production pressures characterized BP executive manager behaviors."
Some proposals call for changes in government policy that could affect
the organization and safety culture at a firm, such as increases in the
1.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 22-25 (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov

news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule-security/getfile&PageID=33646.
2.
See id. at 27-28.
3.
Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf Coast Oil Spill: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 13
(2010) (statement of Rep. Joe Barton), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov
/Press_111/20100512/transcript.05.12.2010.oi.pdf.
4.
DEEP WATER HORIZON STUDY GRP., CTR. FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK MGMT., NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEP WATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 4 (2010),

availableat http://ecnr.berkeley.edulvfs/PPs/Azwell-Tho/web/DHSGReport.pdf.
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liability cap; 5 others note that government policy alone is not adequate
6
to instill a stronger safety culture.
Will the Deepwater Horizon spill cause the industry to adopt a
stronger safety culture on its own, in the absence of policy changes?
Some evidence suggests this may be occurring already. In September
2010, for example, BP announced significant changes in its internal
7
structure and the way in which safety will be handled company-wide.
But the reasons behind such safety-related changes are impossible to
determine. Perhaps BP was responding to new information about
risks. Alternatively, the changes might be a reaction to public
pressure-in other words, new terms in the social contract under
which BP operates. Another possible explanation could be BP's
anticipation of future policy changes, such as stricter regulation. In
that case, its response could be an attempt to preempt stricter
government policies.
Two broad questions have received little attention since
Deepwater Horizon: first, is there economic justification for
government policy aimed at improving safety culture; and second, if
justified, what policies would encourage-or hinder-a stronger safety
culture at firms? This Article provides a framework for evaluating
potential justifications for government intervention and assesses
policy options for improving safety culture.
The next Part discusses the safety culture literature and
provides a theoretical framework for assessing different safety culture
policies. The central premise of our framework is that upper
management chooses internal policies that affect safety culture and
makes decisions that embody it. Lower-level managers and other
employees respond to incentives created by upper management,
thereby creating a link between safety culture and safety outcomes. In
this context, there are two general reasons that a firm may not choose
the socially optimal level of safety culture: (1) the firm might not

5.
6.

See, e.g., Big Oil Bailout Prevention Act of 2010, H.R. 5214, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
For example, Rex Tillerson, CEO of ExxonMobil, testified before the President's

Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, "The answer is not
found only in written rules, standards and procedures. While these are important and necessary,
they alone are not enough. The answer is ultimately found in a company's culture, the unwritten
standards and norms that shape mindsets, attitudes, and behaviors." Rex W. Tillerson,
Statement to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
EXXONMOBIL (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/news-speeches-20101109rwt.aspx.
7. Press Release, BP, Dudley Sets Up New Safety and Risk Unit and Signals Sweeping
Changes at BP (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld
=2012968&contentId=7065250.
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internalize all of the social costs of a spill; and (2) there may be
principal-agent problems within the firm. Both factors create a
potential justification for government policy aimed at promoting a
strong safety culture.
While the framework in Part II applies to any industry, Part
III discusses economic factors that affect safety culture in deepwater
drilling, with particular focus on whether these factors encourage the
socially optimal level of safety culture. Although markets do create
positive incentives for safety culture, there are important
informational problems that may prevent firms from choosing the
socially optimal safety culture. These problems create a justification
for government policies that provide some monitoring (that is, policies
that reveal to the public the degree of safety culture), in addition to
policies that promote a stronger safety culture.
Part IV discusses five policies that could increase safety culture
and monitoring: (1) liability, (2) financial responsibility (a requirement
that a firm's assets exceed a threshold amount), (3) government
oversight, (4) mandatory private insurance, and (5) risk-based drilling
fees. We find that although each policy has a positive effect on safety
culture, there are important differences among the policies-in
particular, the latter three provide external monitoring that could
reduce principal-agent problems. Furthermore, interactions among
these policies mean that they should be jointly determined.
Importantly, raising or eliminating the liability cap without raising
the financial responsibility requirement would be insufficient for
promoting safety culture at small firms, because those firms might
declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill and avoid paying the
costs.
Part V concludes with our policy recommendations for
promoting stronger safety culture in offshore drilling. The two policy
objectives are for firms to internalize the social costs of a spill when
they choose safety culture and for third-party monitoring to increase.
Our preferred approach would be to set a liability cap for each well
equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill and to require insurance
up to the cap. We note that even in this liability regime, the public
may not be able to recover all social costs, and additional policies, such
as stronger government oversight, would be justified. If mandatory
private insurance is not feasible, then raising the cap and the
financial responsibility requirement would also have a significant
effect on safety culture, particularly if this approach is combined with
stronger government oversight. In either case, imposing risk-based
drilling fees (for example, via license fees or insurance premiums)
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would create a further incentive for firms to adopt a stronger safety
culture. Part VI contains a brief summary and concluding remarks.
Before proceeding, we note a caveat to the analysis. There are
numerous ongoing investigations of the causes of the Deepwater
Horizon spill, and there is no definitive assessment of whether an
inadequate safety culture increased the likelihood of the spill or
whether a stronger safety culture would significantly reduce the
likelihood of future accidents.8 Furthermore, despite the growing body
of management literature on high-reliability industries, there is no
consensus about the characteristics that define a strong safety culture
for deepwater drilling. Consequently, our objective is not to identify
specific policies that would have prevented the Deepwater Horizon
spill or to make recommendations on specific changes to safety culture
that would prevent a major spill. Instead, we assess whether policies
for promoting safety culture are economically justified and analyze a
range of policy changes, including the major ones currently under
discussion. Although this analysis is necessarily qualitative, to the
extent possible, we assess the likely significance of each policy.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY OF SAFETY CULTURE
Studies of past major accidents in different industries have
given rise to a substantial management literature on safety culture.
Researchers have examined a range of "high reliability" industries and
tried to identify the characteristics most commonly associated with
firms that have strong safety cultures. One definition of safety culture
in this literature is the set of values promoted by the firm's policies that
lead employees to prioritize health, safety, and the environment.9 Many
8.
See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING,

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, at vi, vii (2011) [hereinafter BP COMM'N REPORT], available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER-ReporttothePresi
dentFINAL.pdf (' The well blew out because a number of separate risk factors, oversights, and
outright mistakes combined to overwhelm the safeguards meant to prevent just such an event
from happening.").
9.

TERRY L. VON THADEN & ALYSSA M. GIBBONS, THE SAFETY CULTURE INDICATOR SCALE

MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 7 (2008). Numerous definitions, often closely related, are available in the
literature. For example, James Reason has defined safety culture as "the product of individual
and group values, attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety
programmes." KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED 127-28
(2001) (citing JAMES T. REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 194

(1997)). In general, "a culture of safety" means that the culture is centered on safety as the main
priority. The term "safety culture" denotes that every organization has a culture of safety that
sits on a spectrum from weak to strong. Organizations with exceptionally strong safety cultures
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policies, initiatives, and procedures affect a deepwater drilling firm's
safety culture and thereby affect employees' actions that could cause a
spill. Examples include providing worker training and using a
compensation structure that encourages individuals to make decisions
that increase safety.
Safety culture can be understood within the context of
corporate culture, defined as "the ways work and authority are
organized, the ways people are rewarded and controlled, as well as
organizational features such as customs, taboos, company slogans,
heroes and social rituals."'10 Safety culture refers to the features of a
firm's culture that specifically affect safety, both that of individual
workers and that of processes that relate to the release of dangerous
or environmentally harmful materials (sometimes called process
safety).1 After the nuclear explosion at Chernobyl in 1986, an entire
body of literature developed on the importance of a strong safety
culture in high-risk industries. 12 Specifically, that work focused on the
3
underlying causes of catastrophic accidents and ways to avoid them.'
We present an overview of the safety culture literature and
give a few examples of policies that indicate a strong safety culture in
industries outside of the oil and gas context. We then outline a
theoretical structure for understanding why a firm selects a particular
level of safety culture, and we provide the economic justification for
government policy intervention.
A. Literatureon Safety Culture in High-Risk Industries
1. Organizations with a Strong Safety Culture
Organizations that operate relatively error free in high-risk
industries over a long period of time are termed high-reliability
that effectively minimize accidents are often referred to as "high-reliability organizations"
("HROs"). For purposes of this Article, we use "strong safety culture" to indicate the qualities of
an HRO.
10.

JAMES A. BRICKLEY, CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR. & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, MANAGERIAL

ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 291 (Katie Crouch ed., 5th ed. 2008).
11. JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., BP U.S. REFINERIES INDEP. SAFETY REVIEW PANEL, REPORT
OF THE BP U.S. REFINERIES INDEPENDENT SAFETY REVIEW PANEL 23 (2007), available at

http://www.bp.comfliveassetsfbp-internetglobalbpglobalbp-uk-english/SPSTAGING/local-asset
s/assets/pdfs/Baker.panel-report.pdf.
12. See generally WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 9; Kathryn Mearns, Sean M. Whitaker &
Rhona Flin, Safety Climate, Safety Management Practice and Safety Performance in Offshore
Environments, 41 SAFETY SCI. 641 (2003); Karlene H. Roberts & Robert Bea, Must Accidents
Happen?Lessons from High-Reliability Organizations,15 ACAD. MGM'T EXECUTIVE 70 (2001).
13. See generally sources cited supranote 12.
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organizations ("HROs"). 14 Several researchers have identified
characteristics of HROs through a combination of empirical studies,
case studies, and application of theoretical frameworks to specific
examples. Weick and Sutcliffe compiled a comprehensive list of
qualities that HROs exhibit, including preoccupation with failure,
reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations,
commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. 15 Weick and
Sutcliffe provide examples of HROs, such as aircraft carriers and
nuclear power plants. 16 Hopkins focuses on three of the attributes
listed above, citing constant worry about failure, reluctance to draw
quick conclusions, and sensitivity to the experience of frontline
operators as important components of safety culture.1 7 Roberts and
Bea expand on these elements and assert that HROs also aggressively
seek out information, design their reward and incentive systems to
recognize costs and benefits of failure versus reliability, and
consistently foster communication among employees about the
organization's mission and where the employees fit in.18 As discussed
in the following Section, the importance of information flows, as well
as flexible decisionmaking, are crucial to successful HROs.
A nuclear power plant is one example of a hazardous worksite
where awareness of risk is central to avoiding catastrophes. The
Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant, for example, exhibits qualities of
an HRO by mandating that employees spend one week of every four in
training.19 Frequent training prevents employees from becoming
complacent and reinforces the idea that the organization strives to
20
learn what it does not know.
Aviation is another high-risk industry in which some
organizations operate with high reliability. An often-cited example is
the 1989 United Airlines flight that experienced an unprecedented
emergency when a secondary engine exploded, cutting off the aircraft's
hydraulic power. 21 The cockpit crew made an emergency landing in
Sioux City, Iowa, where this type of airliner, a DC-10, had never

14.
15.
16.

WEICK & SUTCLIIFE, supra note 9, at 3.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 9.

17.

ANDREW HOPKINS, FAILURE TO LEARN: THE BP TEXAS CITY REFINERY DISASTER 13

(Deborah Powell ed., 2008).
18. Roberts & Bea, supranote 12, at 71.
19. See id. at 73.
20. Id. at 71.
21. Id. at 72.
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landed before. 22 Despite a malfunction in a crucial piece of firefighting
equipment, more than half of the passengers on board survived
because the emergency ground personnel had recently practiced how
to safely land a DC-10. 23 Confounding factors, however, undermine the
conclusion that this is a perfect example of an HRO training its
employees to recognize and respond to irregularities. Because an
instructor pilot who happened to be on board also played a pivotal role
in landing the disabled aircraft, 24 it is difficult to discern to what
extent the outcome was due to luck versus a strong safety culture.
Many airlines behave as HROs, as evidenced by the expensive
precautions they take to minimize risk. 25 It is a subject of debate
whether this is because airlines internally value a strong safety
culture or because they are just complying with legal requirements.
Laws mandate that there be two qualified pilots in the cockpit of a
large commercial aircraft,2 6 and the Federal Aviation Administration
requires that air traffic controllers develop a Safety Management
System. 27 These and other legal provisions force firms to adopt some
HRO-type behaviors, which they may or may not have adopted
otherwise. Scarlett et al. find that the Federal Aviation
Administration's "[s]ite-specific and general environmental and safety
management systems aim to strengthen safety cultures and
accountability within firms . . . [but these systems] require periodic
implementation, and
independent audits of their substance,
28
results."
safety
improving
in
effectiveness
Aircraft carriers operate in extremely dangerous conditions
with little margin for error. To avoid disasters, U.S. Navy aircraft
carriers build redundancy into their operations, such that there are
more than twenty communications devices on board to ensure that the
landing-signal officer is always connected to a commander in the
control tower. 29 Organizations such as the Navy "spend money to
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 75 (stating that airlines employ a redundant pilot on all commercial flights).
26. 14 C.F.R. § 91.531 (2011).
27. See id. § 65.45 (requiring that air traffic controllers follow the procedures and practices
required by the FAA manuals); AIR TRAFFIC ORG., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM MANUAL 1 (2008); see also Roberts & Bea, supra note 12, at 75.
28. Lynn Scarlett et al., Managing Environmental, Health, and Safety Risks: A
Comparative Assessment of the Minerals Management Service and Other Agencies 4 (Res. for the
Future, Discussion Paper No. 10-64, 2011), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP10-64.pdf.
29. Roberts & Bea, supra note 12, at 73.
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create redundancy, there is no question in anyone's mind that the
organization believes it can't know everything and must take the
possibility of accidents seriously," and thus a strong safety culture
30
emerges.
2. Organizations with a Weak Safety Culture
Commonly agreed-upon characteristics of low-reliability
organizations, or organizations prone to catastrophe, are cost cutting,
31
lack of training, poor communication, poor supervision, and fatigue.
Some studies also cite disaggregation of responsibility and inflexible
decisionmaking as contributing factors to disasters. A strong safety
culture requires a balance between centralization and decentralization
of decisionmaking, such that a "delegated capacity for local detection
must be held simultaneously with a centralized capacity that
maintains the organization's larger awareness of its vulnerability and
serves to coordinate responses and learning that occur at the local
level." 32 Weick and Sutcliffe find that an HRO must have flexible
decisionmaking that allows for decisions to come from the top-level
managers during stable times and from further down the ladder
during emergencies. 33 Hopkins argues that complete decentralization
does not allow operations managers to learn from incidents that top
management might have stored away for future institutional
reference. 34
Quantitative comparisons of safety cultures between firms,
occupational groups, and even industries can be made using the safety
attitudes questionnaire developed by Bryan Sexton, Eric Thomas, and
Bob Helmreich. 35 Originally designed for the healthcare industry, the
questionnaire has been used to contrast the safety cultures of airlines
and intensive-care units. 36 The approach has also been applied to

30.
31.

Id. at 73-74.
See, e.g., DEEPWATER HORIZON STUDY GRP., CTR. FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK MGMT.,

PROGRESS REPORT 2, at 1 (2010)

[hereinafter DHSG PROGRESS REPORT 2], available at

http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs-papers/bea pdfs/DHSGJuly-Report-Final.pdf
("[F]ailures
to
contain, control, mitigate, plan, and clean up . . . appear to be deeply rooted in a multi-decade
history of organizational malfunction and shortsightedness.").
32. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 9, at 170.
33. Id.
34. HOPKINS, supranote 17, at 91-106.
35. J. Bryan Sexton, Eric J. Thomas & Robert L. Helmreich, Error, Stress, and Teamwork
in Medicine and Aviation: Cross Sectional Surveys, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 745, 746 (2000).
36. Id. at 745, 747.
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other high-risk industries, such as nuclear power generation and,
37
most recently, offshore oil drilling.
A similar questionnaire was used in an analysis by Mearns to
ascertain whether there was a correlation between safety culture and
the occurrence of accidents. 38 Safety culture scales measure employees'
satisfaction with safety activities, involvement with safety planning,
and safety communication, in addition to attitudinal questions about
safety and the frequency of unsafe behavior. 39 The paper reports an
association between proficient safety management practices and low
levels of accidents officially reported to the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") and self-reported accidents. 40 The
authors note the challenges of interpreting the results to show a
41
causal effect of safety culture on accidents.
In theory, organizations could have avoided numerous
disasters had they incorporated HRO tactics into their operations. For
example, in 2006, an airplane crashed after taking off from the wrong
runway in Lexington, Kentucky, because of confusion about taxi
patterns due to construction. 42 "A small group of aircraft maintenance
workers told the investigators that they also had experienced
confusion when taxiing to conduct engine tests-they worried that an
accident could happen, but did not know how to effectively notify
people who could make a difference." 43 This example demonstrates the
importance of information flows.
Another avoidable incident occurred in 1986 when the space
shuttle Challenger fell apart within the first two minutes of its flight.
Hopkins finds that "the decision to launch the Challenger space
37. Id.
38. Mearns et al., supra note 12, at 646-50. Thirteen separately operated oil rigs were
included in the study. Each rig was assessed based on its safety culture, safety management
practices, and safety performance. Surveys were delivered and filled out by hand. Respondents
answered questions using a five-point scale to indicate their agreement or satisfaction with a
particular safety-related statement. Part 2 of the survey was a safety management
questionnaire, which addressed safety management practices on each oil rig. Responses were
collected in the same manner, and a coding scheme converted qualitative survey answers into
quantitative data. See generally id.
39. Id. at 646.
40. Id. at 664.
41. Id. at 668. For example, the authors note that "[t]he causal direction to this relationship
is questionable because experience of an accident may bias perceptions and attitudes toward
safety." Id.
42. Matthew L. Wald, Crew Sensed Trouble Second Before Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2007/01/18/us/18crash.html?adxnnl=l&adxnnlx=
1315754099-UKLDQJFdJpOH GEO2bjDgLA.
43.

NANcY G. LEVESON, ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD: SYSTEMS THINKING APPLIED TO

SAFETY 352 (2011).
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shuttle was made against the advice of the expert engineers." 44
Hopkins believes that had NASA employed flexible decisionmaking,
45
which is crucial to HROs, the accident would have been avoided.
Weick and Sutcliffe use the example of the Union PacificSouthern Pacific railroad merger to illustrate potential repercussions
of a weak safety culture. 46 Union Pacific experienced several accidents,
some fatal, directly after the merger when its safety culture was in
flux. 47 At that time, errors were underreported or ignored until they
were almost irreversible, top management was composed of people
with homogeneous backgrounds who wanted to simplify operations,
and any employee who relied on expertise to make decisions without
48
explicit permission from supervisors was deemed insubordinate.
Thus, Union Pacific failed to follow many of the essential HRO
practices.
Redundancy is cited as critical to a safety culture, but it is not
always effective at preventing accidents. Occasionally, organizations
incorporate HRO recommendations into their operations but still
experience accidents. For example, in April 1999, a military
communications satellite, Titan IV B-3, was launched into an
49
incorrect, unusable orbit. The loss cost approximately $1.2 billion.
Leveson points out that in this instance, "there were a large number of
redundancies in each part of the process to prevent the loss, but they
were not effective," because sometimes "built-in redundancy itself
causes complacency and overconfidence and is a critical factor in the
50
accident process."
Similarly, in Miami in 1984, a Lockheed L-1011 lost oil
pressure in all three engines simultaneously, because two mechanics
failed to install O-rings on the new engine oil plugs. 51 As in the case of

44. Andrew Hopkins, The Problem of Defining High Reliability Organisations 11 (Nat'l
Research Ctr. for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation, Australian Nat'l Univ., Working
Paper No. 51, 2007).
45. Id.
46. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supranote 9, at 4.
47. Charles Boisseau & David Ivanovich, Union Pacific Put Under Safety Review/33 Cars
Derail in Texas Town in Latest of a String of Accidents, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2007, at Al,
available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1997-1432888/union-pacific-putunder-safety-review-33-cars-dera.html.
48. WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 9, at 12, 15.
49. LEVESON, supra note 43, at 407.
50. Id. at 408.
51. Karen Marais, Nicolas Dulac & Nancy Leveson, Beyond Normal Accidents and High
Reliability Organizations: The Need for an Alternative Approach to Safety in Complex Systems
10 (2004) (Mass. Inst. Tech., Working Paper).
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the Titan IV B-3, "[r]edundancy [did] not provide protection against
52
underlying design errors, only random failures."
Marais et al. further argue that the simultaneously centralized
and decentralized decisionmaking recommended for HROs "can lead to
major accidents in complex socio-technical systems."5 3 For instance,
before a ferry disaster in Zeebrugge, Belgium, "those making decisions
about vessel design, harbor design, cargo management, passenger
management, traffic scheduling, and vessel operation were unaware of
the impact of their decisions on the others and the overall impact on
the process," even though they were all making their decisions
properly according to HRO theory.5 4 These examples suggest that
becoming an HRO is more difficult than simply adopting each
individual policy and procedure that the literature advocates.
3. Safety Culture at BP
Concerns about the safety culture at BP preceded the
Deepwater Horizon spill. Numerous studies analyze the explosion at
BP's Texas City oil refinery in 2005. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board
("CSB") released a landmark report in 2007 concluding that corporate
culture caused the incident. 55 The report asserts that senior executives
did not adequately address major hazard risk or process-safety
performance. 56 External audits conducted by GHSER (BP's Health,
Safety and Environmental Management System Framework) and
Telos (a provider of risk management and insurance broking services)
in 2003-2005 concluded that "Texas City had serious deficiencies in
identifying and controlling major risks." 57 An internal audit by BP in
2004 concurred that "business unit managers' risk management
processes did not understand or control major hazards" across the
corporation. 58 Furthermore, senior executives did not provide effective
safety culture leadership or oversight. Examples included "managers
not following or ensuring enforcement of policies and procedures,
responding ineffectively to a series of reports detailing critical process
safety problems, and focusing on budget cutting goals that
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id.

55.

U.S. CHEM. SAFETY & HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., INVESTIGATION REPORT: REFINERY

EXPLOSION AND FIRE 150,
CSBFina1ReportBP.pdf.
56. Id. at 76.
57. Id. at 184.
58. Id.

183

(2007), available at

http://www.csb.gov/assets/document
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compromised safety."59 In addition, BP managers "did not formally
review the safety implications of policy changes such as cost-cutting
60
strategy prior to making changes."
Above, we noted the importance of providing incentive schemes
that encourage safety and long-term profitability. At BP's Texas City
refinery, each employee received a bonus based on the overall
performance of the refinery. 61 Fifty percent of the bonus was
determined by "cost leadership," or cost cutting, and only ten percent
was determined by safety--calculated as OSHA-reported injuries,
which are a measure of personal safety, not process safety. 62 The
incentives were powerful: refinery managers could receive significant
bonuses, up to forty percent of their salaries. 63 Such incentives can
encourage managers to hide accidents. The Telos Group found that
managers at Texas City would avoid reporting a frontline injury,
sometimes by having the employee return to work immediately in a
different capacity. 64 The report includes an employee anecdote stating,
"minor steam burn resulting in first aid visit; management
65
encouraged self-treatment to avoid OSHA recordable injury."
Managers also had a high rate of turnover and were judged on their
profitability. 66 The short-term mentality combined with improper
67
reward structures created a culture that did not value safety highly.
Hopkins adds that BP officials took for granted that they were
being properly informed of audit results, did not heed warnings from
their subordinates, and relied heavily on the observations of others
rather than inspecting operations firsthand. 68 External audits
completed in 2002 and 2004 of Texas City produced strong, negative
conclusions about BP's safety culture, which were not reported to the
Chief Executive ("CE") of the refining and marketing businesses.6 9 The
CE stated in his deposition, "There were no audits which were coming
to me, for instance, or, indeed, as I understand it, to [my immediate
subordinate] which would have indicated the state of that plant."70 In
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 187.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 84.
Id.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 65, 82, 110.
Id. at 111.
Id.
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addition, BP received several warnings about danger at Texas City,
including one from the health, safety, and environment manager at
Texas City a month before the explosion, who said, "I would like for us
to make these incidents our No. 1 priority . . . I truly believe that we
are on the verge of something bigger happening and that we must
make critical decisions tomorrow morning over getting the workforce's
attention around safety."71 Two investigations of Texas City concluded
that the management team was "not connecting to the workforce in a
meaningful way" and "management was generally unaware of local
practices." 72 The CE did make a visit to Texas City in 2004 but did not
inspect the plant and spoke solely with management, not frontline
workers.7 3 The management team he spoke with informed him that
effective programs were being put in place, and he left with a positive
impression of the safety efforts at Texas City. 74 The CE assumed that
management's reporting was accurate and comprehensive and did not
engage with the frontline workers. 75 Essentially, BP was not an HRO
76
because initiatives were not driven from the top.
Communication between levels of management also appears to
have affected BP's safety culture. While Lord Browne was BP's CEO
from 1995 to 2007, managers recalled, "Only good news flowed
upwards . . . no one dared say the wrong things or challenge the
boss." 77 Tony Hayward, who succeeded Browne, added, "We have a
leadership style that is too directive and doesn't listen sufficiently
well. The top of the organization doesn't listen sufficiently to what the
78
bottom is saying."
After the Texas City incident, BP attempted to shift to an HRO
culture. In July 2010, Robert Dudley (who became CEO in October
2010) said that "Tony [Hayward] started a cultural change three years
ago, around a focus on safe and reliable operations. It is a
fundamentally different company today than it was three years ago..
we've now had this [Deepwater Horizon] incident: we need to
accelerate that change in the culture inside the company." 79 A 2009

71. Id. at 71.
72. Id. at 116.
73. Id. at 109-10.
74. Id. at 110.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 147.
77. Id. at 108.
78. Id. at 109.
79. Ed Crooks, Dudley Vows New BP Safety Culture, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/abl5d58e-994c-lldf-9834-OO144feab49a.html.
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financial risk management report stated that, "[flollowing the health
[and] safety crisis, the company underwent a significant shift in its
corporate culture which resulted in an integrated approach to safety
within the organization."8 0 Analysts expressed concern that this shift
was not permanent: the 2010 report finds that "analysis of BP's
reported [health and safety] statistics 2005-2009 indicates an
improving trend from 2005 until 2009, which is most likely a function
of BP management's increased attention to [environment, health, and
8
safety] ....However, from 2009, performance deteriorated."'
Some reports have attributed the Deepwater Horizon spill, in
part, to a weak safety culture. For example, the Deepwater Horizon
Study Group finds that fatigue, poor communication, and lack of
training characterized many BP employees in previous accidents, such
as the Texas City explosion in 2005, and suspects that those
characteristics also applied to the workers aboard the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig.8 2 Interviews conducted prior to the spill reveal that
employees aboard the rig "felt comfortable raising safety concerns and
ideas for safety improvement to managers on the rig, but felt that they
could not raise concerns at the Divisional or the Corporate level
83
without reprisal."
Following Deepwater Horizon, BP's new management
apparently recognized that previous changes were inadequate to
ensure a safety culture. According to a BP press release, Dudley began
to implement corporate safety changes even before he replaced
Hayward.8 4 A new "Safety & Operational Risk" function will oversee
and audit the company's operations.8 5 The new group will have its own
expert staff "embedded in BP's operating units" and will report
directly to the CEO.8 6 BP will also restructure its upstream division
into exploration, development, and production and will review
87
incentives for safety and risk management.

80. RISKMETRICS GRP., BP PLC 5 (2009).
81. RISKMETRICS GRP., BP PLC 2 (2010).
82. DHSG PROGRESS REPORT 2, supra note 31, at 19. A lot of finger-pointing has occurred
since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. For example, Jack Hackett, the CEO of Anadarko (BP's
partner on the Macondo well), even said, "The mounting evidence clearly demonstrates that this
tragedy was preventable and the direct result of BP's reckless decisions and actions .... BP's
behavior and actions likely represent gross negligence or willful misconduct." Id. at 10.
83. LEVESON, supranote 43, at 352.
84. Press Release, BP, supranote 7.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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4. Why Aren't All Firms HROs?
The preceding discussion raises the question as to why all
firms are not HROs. Hopkins suggests that organizations do not
always behave in their best interest because "organizations
themselves don't act-individuals within them do," an observation
that makes failure to invest in safety more understandable.8 8 In many
cases, employees do not have the proper incentives to behave in
manners consistent with an HRO. Executives may be pressured to
perform quickly and cheaply and may perceive safety as less
important.
Information flow between individuals, particularly up and
down the hierarchy, has also prevented firms from engaging in HRO
behaviors. According to Hopkins, "[r]esearch shows that, prior to every
major accident, information was available somewhere in the
organization pointing to the fact that trouble was brewing, but this
information failed to make its way upwards to people with the
capacity and inclination to take effective action."8 9 Top managers need
to convey to all employees the importance of reporting all information,
both positive and negative. 90 Thus, the literature suggests that some
firms may not be HROs because upper management does not provide
the correct incentives for employees to report all information. In order
to provide correct incentives, upper management may need to make
tradeoffs between short-run costs and long-term safety. Roberts and
Bea note that HROs
seek to establish reward and incentive systems that balance the costs of potentially
unsafe but short-run profitable strategies with the benefits of safe and long-run
profitable strategies. They make it politically and economically possible for people to
make decisions that are both short-run safe and long-run profitable. This is important to
ensure that the focus of the organization is fixed on accident avoidance. When
organizations focus on today's profits without consideration of tomorrow's problems, the
91
likelihood of accidents increases.

Hopkins asserts that employees are driven not only by
financial incentives but also by praise and criticism. 9 2 It is widely
acknowledged within the management literature that to instill a
particular culture, performance evaluations and rewards must
reinforce that culture. Hence, if cost cutting is more important than

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 83.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Roberts & Bea, supranote 12, at 74.
HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 84.
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safety in a manager's evaluation and reward structure, then it would
not be surprising to see safety taking second place to cost cutting.
5. Summary of the Safety Culture Literature
Before presenting a theoretical structure for analyzing
government policies and safety culture, we list a few specific policies
and procedures that researchers have suggested indicate a strong
safety culture in other industries. These safety culture indicators may
or may not apply to deepwater drilling, but they help ground the
theoretical discussion that follows.
The literature emphasizes that safety culture must be
advocated by upper management. Consider a few specific policies and
procedures that are adopted at firms with strong safety cultures: (1)
redundancy; (2) compensation schemes, including bonuses, that
emphasize safety performance; (3) the employment of appropriately
trained individuals with the provision of continual on-the-job training;
and (4) regular analysis of how changes affect safety (i.e.,
management of change).
Redundancy should be built into emergency preparation and
day-to-day operations. A firm could achieve a stronger safety culture
by requiring more than one qualified person to assess operations and
having a variety of people at different management levels sign off on
all operational changes. This would also guarantee a smooth
information flow between senior executives, managers, and frontline
workers.
Compensation schemes play a central role in promoting a
strong safety culture. Consider a firm whose managers' compensation
depends exclusively on the operating profits of their business units.
Each manager will try to reduce costs even if doing so increases the
number of accidents within the unit (as long as the accidents do not
result in a larger increase in costs). In the case of Texas City, the
Baker Panel recommended "making a significant portion of total
compensation of refining line managers and supervisors contingent on
satisfactorily meeting process safety performance indicators and
goals"; the panel made a similar recommendation regarding
nonmanagerial workers.9 3 Such changes should be implemented
carefully in order to minimize the perverse incentives for reporting the
accidents noted above.

93.

BAKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 251.
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Hiring well-trained workers and providing on-the-job training
is also consistent with a strong safety culture. For example, the Baker
report noted that "HROs spend disproportionately more money than
other organizations training people to recognize and respond to
anomalies." 94 Both actions are likely to increase the costs of the firm,
but they represent a prioritization of safety over short-term costs.
Many decisions made by employees affect safety, although the
effects of these decisions are not readily apparent. Analyzing the
effects of such decisions is costly to the firm, in terms of time and
money. A willingness to pay the costs and undertake the analysis
represents a prioritization of safety over costs and is thus indicative of
an HRO.
B. TheoreticalFramework for EvaluatingGovernment Policy and
Safety Culture
Researchers have described the characteristics of firms with
strong safety cultures but have not attempted to explain why some
firms adopt a strong safety culture and others do not. In the previous
Section, we provided a general framework for analyzing safety culture
based on the extent to which an organization establishes and enforces
its safety goals through hiring and training employees and providing
proper incentives that emphasize safety. Despite some discussion
about the incentives or disincentives for adopting a strong safety
culture (e.g., cost), we are unaware of previous literature that has
addressed directly the role of government policy. We therefore turn to
the literature on corporate criminal behavior and the design of optimal
sanctions to control illegal activities as the basis for our evaluation of
potential government policies. 95 There are direct parallels between

94. Roberts & Bea, supra note 12, at 72. For example, the report notes that the Diablo
Canyon training involves "a wide range of unusual and potentially dangerous scenarios to test
operator knowledge and reactor time . . . it also keeps them alert to all the things that can go
wrong and reinforces the idea that the organization needs to aggressively know what it doesn't
know to keep a catastrophe from occurring." Id. at 73.
95. Corporate crime can be modeled just like the decision to engage in any illegal activity or
to avoid activities that are designed to prevent harmful activity. See Mark A. Cohen & Sally S.
Simpson, The Origins of Corporate Criminality:Rational Individual and OrganizationalActors,
in DEBATING CORPORATE CRIME 33, 34 (William S. Lofquist, Mark A. Cohen & Gary A. Rabe eds.,
1997) ("But these distinctions [between responses to administrative and criminal violations] are
driven by the legal system-not by any inherent differences in the violations themselves.").
Indeed, because of U.S. law and the nature of corporate criminal liability, virtually any oil spill
in the U.S. subjects the responsible party to potential criminal liability--essentially at the
discretion of government prosecutors. The underlying economic theory of why individuals commit
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this literature and our analysis of the potential rationale for
government policies designed to increase organizational safety
culture.
We begin with the assumption that a firm engaged in
deepwater drilling maximizes profits. For the moment, we assume
there are no conflicts of interest between shareholders, managers, and
other employees at the firm (i.e., there are no agency costs), so that
the incentives within the firm are perfectly aligned. Consequently,
decisions made by employees are always in the best interest of the
firm's profits. We also assume that the owners of the firm care only
about profits and not about their personal reputations or the
environmental consequences of their firm's behavior. These
assumptions are strong but will be relaxed later in the discussion. For
convenience, we conceive of a firm choosing the level of safety culture
along a continuum. A particular level of safety culture represents the
adoption of certain policies and procedures, such as those discussed
above, that have an effect on safety outcomes. The government cannot
directly control the level of safety culture, but can enact policies that
affect the costs and benefits of adopting a particular safety culture.
One of the aims of this Section is to characterize the factors that affect
the desired level of safety culture.
A profit-maximizing firm weighs the expected benefits of
adopting a stronger safety culture that would accrue to the firm
against the expected costs that the firm would bear. An example of a
benefit is that a stronger safety culture reduces the likelihood of a
catastrophe and ensuing lawsuits; an example of a cost is that higher
wages must be paid to workers who have more training. The following
sections discuss at length the economic and policy factors that affect
these costs and benefits. In short, individuals and firms choose the
major elements of safety culture in response to economic, legal, and
other regulatorypressures.
We adopt the standard perspective in welfare economics that
government intervention may be justified if the private market does
not lead to the socially desirable outcome (here, the socially optimal
level of safety culture). 96 That is, only in that case could government

unlawful activities is generally attributed to Becker and was expanded by Cohen to incorporate
corporate environmental crimes.
96. The basic tenet of welfare economics is allocative efficiency, perhaps best characterized
by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion which states that a policy should be adopted if and only if those
who gain from the policy could fully compensate those who lose and still be better off.
Importantly, this criterion does not require such payments-only the fact that the winner's value
exceeds the loser's costs. See J. R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105
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policy lead to an economically efficient outcome (the framework
focuses on economic efficiency and does not consider distributional
consequences of government policies). In the context of deepwater
drilling, some benefits of adopting a strong safety culture may not be
internalized by the firm. For example, society may not be compensated
fully for environmental degradation. 97 In this example, the social
benefit of increasing safety culture exceeds the private benefit, in
which case the firm will adopt a weaker safety culture than society
would like. This constitutes the first justification for government
intervention. It follows directly that policies that align the incentives
of the public with those of the firm-that is, policies that internalize
the externalities-would likely improve economic efficiency.
Thus far, we have assumed away any conflicts within the firm
or the possibility that individuals within the firm care about anything
other than profits. We now broaden the discussion by relaxing these
assumptions.
More specifically, we have assumed that the firm's policies are
actually carried out by its employees-something that is less and less
likely as the firm expands and the cost of monitoring the actions of
managers and employees increases. Firms engaged in deepwater oil
and gas production certainly have such concerns-not only with
employees but also with the many subcontractors they hire for
exploration and production. This "principal-agent" relationship
between owners and managers or between firms and subcontractors
causes a divergence of interests that may result in more (or fewer)
precautions to prevent a catastrophic event than the owner of the firm
would prefer. 98 Because of this divergence of interests, the firm's
owners will decide what ex ante training programs, internal
monitoring policies, and so forth to put in place and what ex post
rewards and punishments, such as monetary compensation,

(1940); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). In the context of oil-spill prevention, the winners are the public at
large, and the policy should be adopted if their gain exceeds the cost of prevention (even if cost of
prevention is borne by others).
97. See Alan Krupnick et al., Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Deepwater Oil
Drilling Regulation 37-44 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 10-62, 2011), available at

http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-10-62.pdf (discussing whether external damages are
internalized by oil firms).
98. Cohen and Simpson model this divergence between owners and managers of the firm in
the context of corporate crime and estimate the extent to which crime is likely to be the outcome
of this divergence of interests. Cohen & Simpson, supra note 95, at 40.
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promotions or firings, and nonpecuniary benefits of the job, to give its
managers and employees. 99
To illustrate, assume for simplicity that there is only one owner
and one manager of the firm. The owner (principal) hires the manager
(agent), who has the expectation of earning a reasonable wage.
Suppose further that there are two ways to achieve a given level of
profit: one that involves designing and enforcing a safety culture and
one that does not. 100 Society desires a safety culture because of the
resulting lower probability of a catastrophic spill, but suppose, for the
moment, that such a spill would not affect the firm's profits (i.e., the
costs of the spill are not internalized). The safety culture requires
more work on the part of the manager, whereas the absence of a safety
culture results in the same profits but requires significantly less time
and work. Thus, the manager can increase "leisure time" and work
fewer hours (or otherwise increase perks on the job) while maintaining
the owner's profits by not implementing a safety culture.
For comparison, suppose that firms are held liable for accidents
attributed to not having an adequate safety culture (i.e., the costs of
such accidents are fully internalized by the owner), such that the
social and private benefits of a safety culture are the same. In this
case, the owner would clearly prefer the safety culture, and there is a
divergence of interests between owner and manager. In the extreme,
where the owner cannot observe the manager's actions and the
manager is not held personally liable for unsafe activities, the outcome
is clear: the manager will shirk on promoting a safety culture even
though the owner wants a strong safety culture. Although this
simplification ignores some other possible constraints on the
manager's actions, such as moral inhibition, the point is that, as long
as the owner cannot perfectly monitor the daily actions of the
manager, there is a risk that the manager will not adopt a safety
culture because the costs outweigh the benefits to him.
Given the above scenario, we would expect the owner of the
firm to put mechanisms in place to align his own incentives with those
of his manager. These mechanisms might involve costly monitoring
devices, such as internal audits, extra layers of management approval
for certain actions, or random third-party inspections. The owner
might also offer monetary incentives or promotion to a manager whose

99. Id.
100. In the principal-agent discussion, we refer to safety culture as an either-or decisioneither the firm has one or it does not. The model can be generalized to allow safety culture to be
chosen from a continuum.
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unit achieves certain levels of performance and threaten demotion or
dismissal of a manager whose unit does not. Of course, if the owner
wants to encourage unsafe behavior, then the opposite incentives
might be put in place. Ultimately, although the owner may not be
directly involved in day-to-day decisions by the manager, his decisions
on the size and intensity of internal compliance programs,
compensation and performance evaluation processes, strategic plans,
and so forth may be thought of as choosing a "probability" that the
manager (agent) pursues an unsafe culture. Because such policies are
costly, the owner may choose a probability of safety culture that is less
than the socially desirable level.
To summarize the preceding discussion of principal-agent
theory, even if social and private benefits (i.e., to the owner) of safety
culture are equal, the firm may not adopt a safety culture because of
agency costs. This is consistent with Hopkins's argument, noted above,
that employees may not always act in the firm's best interests. 10 1
Similarly, the level of safety culture may be less than socially optimal
if the social and private benefits to the agent are equal, but the owner
benefits less from safety culture than does the agent. Agency problems
thus create a second potentialjustificationfor government policy.
Note that information plays an important role in the principalagent theory, because it is the owner's inability to observe the
manager's actions that increases the owner's costs of incentivizing the
manager to adopt a safety culture. Below, we consider the implications
of other aspects of information that affect safety culture, including
whether the owner knows how to instill a strong safety culture.
The final consideration is that individuals may care about
other things besides a firm's profits. The corporate crime literature
discusses quality of life, reputation, self-respect, moral inhibitions,
and aversion to jail time and fines. 10 2 As noted above, Hopkins finds
that praise and criticism, and not just financial compensation, affect a
manager's decisions. 10 3 Once these other factors are considered, a firm
may adopt a higher safety culture than society desires-if, for
example, the firm's owner has an extremely strong preference for
environmental quality. Furthermore, individuals and firms differ in
many of these aspects. Because the costs and benefits of a safety
culture may vary both by firm and by individual, the level of safety
101. See HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 89 (finding that the interests of individuals were not
aligned with the interests of the organization regarding process safety, largely as a result of
incentive structures).
102. See, e.g., Cohen & Simpson, supra note 95, at 45-47.
103. HOPKINS, supranote 17, at 84-85.
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culture may vary across firms within an industry, and it may vary
across business units within a firm.
III. ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR SAFETY CULTURE IN DEEPWATER
DRILLING

In the previous Section, we provided a theoretical framework in
which: (1) day-to-day decisions about whether to implement a safety
culture are the consequences of individual choices; (2) individual
choices are affected by economic and policy incentives; and (3) the
interests of owners, managers, and employees may not be aligned. In
this setting, there are two potential justifications for government
policy: (a) the firm may not fully internalize the social benefits of
adopting a strong safety culture; and (b) agency problems may cause
the firm to adopt a weaker safety culture than if the agency problems
did not exist. Part IV evaluates policies that would affect safety
culture. Before beginning that discussion, however, we discuss in
greater detail the economic incentives for safety culture.
A. Does the Market Punish a Poor Safety Record?
Consumers and investors are often mentioned as two forces
that might have an important influence on firms with poor safety
records. If consumers thought that a firm's safety record posed a risk
to them directly, through product quality or safety concerns, then this
would no doubt be priced into the firm's product and would have a
significant effect on a firm's behavior.
In the case of oil drilling, however, production risks do not
translate into lower-quality oil. Instead, it is possible that because
many consumers care about the environment, some may decide to
purchase products based on their perception of the company's safety or
environmental record. They may want to send a message to a firm
with a weak safety record, or they may derive some nonmonetary
value from punishing such firms. In other words, consumers might be
willing to pay a higher price or switch to a lower-quality or less
convenient brand. Survey research finds that some U.S. consumers
10 4
are willing to pay such a premium.
104. For example, a 2008 survey of the U.S. public found that approximately fifty percent of
respondents indicated they would probably pay up to fifteen percent more for environmentally
friendly laundry detergent or automobiles, and approximately forty percent would pay more for
environmentally friendly computer printer paper or wood furniture. GFK ROPER PUBLIC AFFAIRS
& MEDIA AND YALE SCHOOL OF FORESTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, THE GFK ROPER YALE
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There is also anecdotal evidence in the United States (and in
Europe) that consumers have boycotted petroleum companies,
including Shell (following the Brent Spar incident), Exxon (following
the Exxon Valdez accident), and BP (following the Deepwater Horizon
spill).10 5 Although the effect of these boycotts is generally temporary
and limited in geographic and/or demographic scope, they can affect
short-term profits. For example, "[a] consumer boycott of Shell
products, organized by Greenpeace and the Green Party, hit
particularly hard in Germany, where sales dropped by 30%."106 At
least in the case of the Brent Spar incident, consumer boycotts were
apparently significant enough to be a major contributing factor
leading to a change in corporate policy. 10 7 Indeed, after the Deepwater
Horizon incident, anecdotal evidence suggests there were significant
and painful boycotts by consumers against branded BP oil-something
08
that appears to have hurt small business owners as much as BP.
Clearly, this is more relevant for vertically integrated companies, like
BP, than for deepwater drilling companies that do not have branded
products and do not participate in retail markets.
Reputation can provide incentives for adopting a strong safety
culture. Information that a firm has been sanctioned for violating
environmental laws may be of interest to shareholders or lenders if
the monetary sanction reduces the expected value of the firm and thus
its share price or bond rating. It may also give lenders and insurers
pause about risking more capital on that particular firm. 10 9 Other
costs to having a weak safety culture might include debarment from
SURVEY ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 9 (July 2008), available at http://environment.research.
yale.edu/documents/downloads/a-g/GfK-Roper-Yale-Survey.pdf. However, for a less optimistic
view of actual consumer demand for green products, see Joel Makower, Earth Day and the
Polling of America 2011, GREENBIz, Mar. 28, 2011, www.greenbiz.com/blog/2011/03/28/earthday-and-polling-america-201 1.
105. See Brent Spar Gets Chop, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 1998), http://news.bbc.co.uld2/
hileurope/221508.stm; Scott Neuman, As BP Backlash Grows, So Do Calls for Boycott, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (May 25, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=127110643&ft
=1&f=1003; Larry Tye, Outrage Over Oil Spill Fuels Exxon Boycott, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 19, 1989,
at 29, available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/boston/access/61455369.html?FMT=ABS&date=
Apr 19, 1989.
106. Alan Neale, OrganisationalLearning in Contested Environments: Lessons from Brent
Spar, 6 Bus. STRATEGY & THE ENV'T 93, 99 (1997).
107. Id.
108. See Neuman, supra note 105 (noting calls for a boycott of BP gasoline and finding that
previous boycotts of gas retailers had failed to impact corporate profits primarily because most of
the stations were independently owned).
109. Sharfman and Fernando find that firms with lower environmental risk have a lower
cost of capital. Mark P. Sharfman & Chitru S. Fernando, Environmental Risk Management and
the Cost of Capital. 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 569, 587 (2008).
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future government contracts and targeted enforcement by regulatory
agencies.
Several studies looking at bad environmental news, such as oil
or chemical spills or the announcement of civil or criminal
enforcement actions, have demonstrated a negative stock price
effect. 110 Because stock prices are generally thought to represent the
market's best estimate of future profitability, a stock price reduction
that exceeds the expected cost of penalties and cleanup could be
attributed to a "reputation" penalty.11 1 Most studies, however, fail to
find any reputational penalty from environmental violations: stock
prices appear to decline roughly by the same amount as the value of
the direct cost to the firm, including cleanup costs, tort liability,
government-imposed sanctions, and so forth.1 1 2 For example, Jones et
al. studied the effect of the Exxon Valdez spill on Exxon's stock price
and estimated a cost to shareholders of $4.7 billion to $11.3 billionwithin the range of estimates of the ultimate cost to Exxon of the spill
itself.1 13 Similar results appear to hold in the case of the BP Deepwater
Horizon spill-with initial stock price losses roughly equal to the
estimated future spill-related costs to BP. 11 4

110. See, e.g., Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante, The Market Response to Environmental
Incidents in Canada:A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 60 S. ECON. J. 657, 671 (1994);
Michael I. Muoghalu, H. David Robison & John L. Glascock, Hazardous Waste Lawsuits,
Stockholder Returns, and Deterrence, 57 S. ECON. J. 357, 365 (1990).
111. See Mark A. Cohen, Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy, in
INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 1999/2000, at 44, 94
(Tom Tietenberg & Henk Folmer eds., 1999) (finding that additional market-value drop beyond
the cost of penalties and cleanup may be a penalty itself that the environmental violator must
bear).
112. E.g., Kari Jones & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Harmful Environmental Events on
Reputations of Firms, 6 ADVANCES FIN. ECON. 161, 179 (2001); Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R.
Lott, Jr. & Eric W. Wehrly, The ReputationalPenalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical
Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 671 (2005).
113. Mark A. Cohen, A Taxonomy of Oil Spill Costs: What are the Likely Costs of the
Deepwater Horizon Spill? 3 (Resources for the Future, 2010) (on file with author).
114. For example, the market value of BP had dropped by approximately $57 billion between
the day of the accident and June 1, 2010, when the full extent of the spill was just becoming
known. However, during that time the average value of the FISE 100 company fell by about ten
percent. Thus, adjusting for this average decline, BP's market value dropped about $38 billion as
a result of the spill (and perhaps more over time). This is close to the $40.9 billion BP estimated
the spill has cost through the end of the fourth quarter of 2010. BP P.L.C., GROUP RESULTS,
FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL YEAR 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.
bp.com/liveassetsbp-internetglhbalbp/STAGING/global-assets/downloads/Bhbp-fourth-quarter2010_results.pdf.
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B. Lack of AppropriateInformation
For markets to function efficiently, decisionmakers must have
adequate information. There are several ways that imperfect
information prevents the establishment of appropriate compensation
schemes and other elements of a strong safety culture. First, even if it
would be profitable for a firm to adopt a strong safety culture, upper
managers may not know what policies to put in place. For example, in
the Texas City accident, by focusing on worker injuries rather than
problems at the system level, managers may not have used the
appropriate safety metrics. 116 Since the Deepwater Horizon spill,
interest in developing safety metrics that can be used to predict the
11 6
possibility of a future accident has grown.
This argument could be extended to assert that there is no
need for government intervention. Suppose it is profitable to adopt a
strong safety culture, but some firms do not know how to adopt it.
Furthermore, assume the market is competitive, such that high-cost
firms will eventually exit the industry. In that case, market pressures
will cause firms with weak safety cultures to exit, and in the long run,
the likelihood of a major accident should be very low because all firms
that remain in the industry will have strong safety cultures.
There are two problems with this argument, however. First, a
significant number of major accidents may occur before market
pressures drive out the firms with poor safety culture. Because of the
high external costs of such accidents, this firm exit is clearly not
desirable from the public's perspective. Second, government
intervention may be needed precisely because some firms do not know
how to adopt a strong safety culture. The government could raise the
cost of failing to adopt a strong safety culture, which would hasten the
exit of firms that do not know how to implement it, or the government
could increase the incentive for those firms to learn. This type of policy
is discussed in more detail below.
Another information problem is that firm managers simply
might not have adequate information about the expected cost of not
adopting a strong safety culture. In particular, firm managers might
have inadequate information about the probability of a spill or its
potential magnitude. Before the Deepwater Horizon spill, the risk
115. U.S. CHEM. SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., supra note 55, § 1.6.7.
116. See Roger M. Cooke, Heather L. Ross & Adam Stern, PrecursorAnalysis for Offshore Oil
and Gas Drilling: From Prescriptive to Risk-Informed Regulation 1 (Res. for the Future,
Discussion Paper No. 10-61, 2011) (considering precursor analysis as a method to reduce the risk
of oil-spill events).
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model used by the industry and the government indicated that the
most likely size of a large spill at the Macondo well was 4,600 barrels
and no more than 26,000 barrels over the entire forty-year life of the
production activity on six leases, including the Macondo well-a117
fraction of the nearly five million barrels of oil actually spilled.
Thus, to the extent that the expected cost of not adopting a safety
culture is underestimated, firms are likely to underinvest in a safety
culture.
C. Conflicts of Interest Between Shareholdersand Managers
A particularly salient information problem is that shareholders
or managers may not have sufficient information to monitor
employees' safety-related decisions. As discussed previously, there is
an inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and the top
management of a company. This conflict is most apparent in large,
publicly traded companies, but it is also evident in any organization
where top managers are not the owners of the firm. Of particular
relevance for this Article, shareholders may have a greater interest in
safety and environment when a manager's compensation is linked to
short-term profits (such as performance bonuses). The manager's
decisions increase short-term profits by reducing safety, while
decreasing long-run profits by exposing the firm to liability from a
catastrophic spill. Managers may simply shirk on their responsibility
to provide an adequate safety culture because providing such a culture
takes significant effort, and it is difficult for shareholders to monitor
the managers' behavior. The corporate governance literature focuses
on mechanisms designed to overcome these conflicts of interest. A
review of the corporate governance literature, for example, noted:
The fundamental insight from which the field of corporate governance emanates is that
there are potential problems associated with the separation of ownership and control
that is inherent in the modern corporate form of organization. Corporate governance,
then, encompasses the set of institutional and market mechanisms that induce selfvalue of the residual cash flows of
interested managers (the controllers) to maximize the
118
the firm on behalf of its shareholders (the owners).

The corporate governance literature generally considers four
mechanisms by which managerial effort can be aligned more closely
with shareholders: (1) legal and regulatory mechanisms; (2) internal
control mechanisms; (3) external control mechanisms; and (4) product
117. Scarlett et al., supranote 28, at 6.
118. Diane K. Denis, Twenty-five Years of Corporate Governance Research... and Counting,
10 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 192 (2001).
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market competition. 119 None of these mechanisms is perfect, as each
comes with its own costs. Although government actions might affect
the external control and product market mechanisms, the most direct
way in which the government affects governance is through the first
two mechanisms.
Numerous laws and regulations at both the state and federal
levels are designed to align the interests of shareholders and
managers-that is, to protect shareholders from managerial behaviors
that might reduce the value of their shares. For example, although a
board of directors has many protections from shareholder lawsuits,
the board may be vulnerable to shareholder derivative lawsuits if
there is a serious conflict of interest or if it did not take due care in
arriving at a decision that has a major effect on corporate
performance. 120 The standards for such lawsuits are very high,
however, and it might take gross negligence or willful ignorance of
signs of mismanagement on the part of a board, for example, to hold
directors personally liable for shareholder losses due to a catastrophic
spill.121 Many of the laws and regulations dealing with internal
controls refer to transparency and the provision of adequate
information so that investors can properly estimate the firm's future
profitability. 122 Thus, if a board knows of a serious material risk to the
firm (e.g., safety standards that were significantly below industry
standards) and fails to inform investors, then it may be in violation of
123
federal securities laws.
119. See Michael Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failureof Internal
Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 850 (1993) (describing the "only four control forces operating on
the corporation to resolve the problems caused by a divergence between managers' decisions and
those that are optimal from society's standpoint").
120. The business judgment rule protects firm directors, but only so long as those directors
respect their fiduciary duties, including the duties of loyalty and due care. See RALPH C.
FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: BESIEGING THE BOARD § 5.01[1], at 5-3

to 5-5 (1995) (explaining the Delaware Supreme Court's interpretation of the business judgment
rule); id. § 5.03[4], at 5-22 to 5-31 (demonstrating increased willingness of Delaware courts in
recent years to question directors' decisions that previously would have been shielded by the
rule).
121. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) ("We think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper
standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an
informed one.").
122. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) ("The primary purpose of the
Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring publication of material information thought
necessary to allow them to make informed investment decisions concerning public offerings of
securities in interstate commerce.").
123. For example, officers and directors of Waste Management were denied summary
judgment in a derivative lawsuit alleging they misrepresented to investors the extent to which
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The literature on internal controls has considered the makeup
of the board of directors, executive compensation, and the role of large
institutional investors. 124 Managers are more likely to be aligned with
shareholders when the board has a significant number of independent,
or outside, directors 125-that is, directors who are not employees of the
firm and do not have personal or business ties to its managers. In
well-designed governance structures, only outside directors can be
members of the board's compensation and audit committees.
Traditional executive compensation schemes may reduce
incentives for a strong safety culture. Research has concluded that
managers are more likely to act in shareholders' interests if doing so
results in greater compensation; however, structuring compensation to
maximize shareholder value is complicated. 126 For example, while
stock options are often used to tie pay to performance, the fact that
stock options create upside potential without corresponding downside
risk has been found to result in managers taking risks often at the
expense of shareholders.1 27 Thus, even though a top manager might
lose his job in the event of a catastrophic spill, the downside risk is
generally small relative to the upside potential for significant earnings
based on short-term profitability. There is general agreement,
however, that an independent board of directors plays an important
role in monitoring the long-term strategic focus of managers to ensure
that manager incentives are aligned better with the interests of
shareholders.1 28 Thus, for example, it is thought that firms with an
effective board-level environment or safety committees and
the firm was complying with environmental regulations. See Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc. 589
F. Supp. 395, 417 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The court held that, despite the arguments of the defendants
to the contrary, a misrepresentation about the firm's environmental compliance record in
violation of Rule 10b-5 did not require direct contact between the officer and the shareholders to
be actionable. See id. at 403.
124. See, e.g., Denis, supra note 118, at 199-205.
125. See id. at 200 (discussing situations in which firms whose boards have a higher
proportion of independent directors tend to make decisions more favorable to shareholders).
126. See id. at 201-02 (noting the benefits and potential drawbacks associated with the
modern trend of equity-based executive compensation).
127. See, e.g., Win. Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the Fences: The
Effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J.
1055, 1074 (2007) (finding that CEOs whose compensation packages include higher levels of
stock options tend to take on more and larger uncertain acquisitions and also pay a higher
premium for their bets); Zhang et al., CEOs on the Edge: Earnings Manipulation and StockBased Incentive Misalignment, 51 ACAD. MGMT. J. 241, 252 (2008) (finding that CEOs with stock
options were more likely to engage in illegal earnings manipulation).
128. See Denis, supra note 118, at 200 (providing evidence that firms with greater
proportions of outsiders on their boards are more likely to remove poorly performing managers
and tend to make better acquisition-related decisions).
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managerial
compensation
tied
to observable
measures
of
environmental protection or safety culture may exhibit stronger
environmental performance or safety culture. 129
Empirical evidence suggests that corporate crime is more likely
to be committed by firms whose managers and shareholders are not
fully aligned"31 and-especially for environmental crimes-by firms
that are relatively weak financially. 13 1 Similar findings come from
Kassinis and Vafeas, who report that corporate boards can be an
important
factor
in
determining
corporate
environmental
performance. 32 Findings like these might help target government
monitoring and enforcement efforts by focusing them on firms that are
at the highest risk of a catastrophic spill. They might also serve as
another justification for financial responsibility requirements: firms
that are relatively weak are not only more likely to have spills, but are
also less able to cover the costs of a spill.133
The government does not often take a direct role in specifying
internal controls, but laws such as Sarbanes-Oxley require disclosure
of internal controls and any factors that might prevent the firm from
accurately reporting financial results. 134 Sarbanes-Oxley appears to

129. See, e.g., George Pilko, EHS Oversight: What's Wrong with This Picture?, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS (July 2005), http://directorsandboards.com/DBEBRIEFING/July2OO5/ColumnJuly2005.
html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (arguing for the importance of board-level committees dealing
with environmental, health, and safety issues). The empirical evidence on this, however, has not
yet been fully established. For example, Berrone and Gomez-Mejia failed to find such an
association in their study of 469 U.S. firms. Pascual Berrone & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia,
Environmental Performance and Executive Compensation: An Integrated Agency-Institutional
Perspective, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 103, 103 (2009) (finding in a study of 469 publicly traded
American companies that "firms with . . . an environmental committee do not reward
environmental strategies more than those without such structures, suggesting that these
mechanisms play a merely symbolic role"). This finding is not inconsistent with Pilko's concern,
however, that U.S. EHS board committees have not been as effective as they have been in
Europe.
130. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals?
Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 30 (1999)
("[C]orporate crimes ... tend to occur less frequently among publicly traded firms in which top
management has a larger ownership stake.").
131. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, New Evidence on the Origins of Corporate
Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421, 432 (1996) ("[T]he data suggest that relatively
low sales and/or employment growth by the firm and relatively high growth by the industry have
tended to precede environmental crime.").
132. See George Kassinis & Nikos Vafeas, Corporate Boards and Outside Stakeholders as
Determinantsof Environmental Litigation, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 399, 400 (2002) ("[B]oards are
ultimately responsible for corporate environmental strategy, whether that strategy is proactively
pursued or passively rubber-stamped.").
133. See infra Part IV.B.
134. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2006).
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have had a positive effect on firms that had previously been below
industry standards for shareholder disclosures, suggesting that such
requirements might give shareholders information not otherwise
disclosed by top management. For example, Chhaochharia and
Grinstein found that firms not already in compliance with SarbanesOxley requirements saw their value rise relative to competitors that
were already in or near compliance when the law was passed. 135 They
suggest that the market expected the law to improve the performance
of those firms. 136 They also state, however, that this trend did not hold
true for smaller firms, implying that some provisions of SarbanesOxley would be detrimental to small firms. 137 Indeed, some evidence
indicates that firms have been reluctant to go public because of the
138
cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley.
What evidence shows that shareholders care more than
managers about safety and reducing the risk of a catastrophic spill?
That corporate offenders are less likely to have managers aligned with
shareholders 139 is one clue: if crime "paid" for shareholders, we would
likely see more offenses in firms whose top management was closely
aligned with shareholders. Why would shareholders accept this higher
risk from some firms? One reason might simply be lack of information.
Indeed, in the case of deepwater drilling, investors are unlikely to
know more about the risks of a catastrophic spill than either
government or industry experts. The corollary, of course, is that now
that the risks are better known, investors will take this into account.
This still assumes, however, that investors have adequate information
about the relative risks of each firm in the industry. Nonfinancialrating firms do provide some of this information to investors, with

135. See Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The
Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules, 62 J. FIN. 1789, 1791 (2007) (finding that firms that were
less compliant with the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley at the time the rules were announced
earned returns between six and twenty percent greater than those of peer firms with higher
levels of compliance during the rule-announcement period).
136. See, e.g., id. at 1798 ('We expect that if the new rules are effective, then firms that are
perceived as fraudulent with respect to insider trading and financial reporting should increase in
value compared to firms that are perceived as less fraudulent.").
137. See id. at 1822 (finding that "the rules associated with board independence and internal
controls do not enhance the value of small firms, since small firms that are less compliant with
the board independence provisions and ... the internal control provisions exhibit lower returns
compared to other firms").
138. Id. at 1791 (indicating that the internal control and director independence provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley might impose excessive costs on smaller firms).
139. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 130, at 30 ("[C]orporate crime does not appear to be
a random event beyond top management's control. The evidence is that incentives of top
management affect conduct at all levels of the corporate hierarchy.").
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analyses that focus on nonfinancial risks and opportunities. We
previously mentioned one example, RiskMetrics, whose analysts
closely followed safety culture at BP and other oil and gas
companies. 140 Such information, especially with respect to drilling
safety culture, may now be followed more carefully by mainstream
investors.
D. Conflicts of Interest Between Firm and Subcontractor
Public discussion about the relative liability of BP and its
subcontractors raises the question of whether incentives are properly
aligned between a firm (lease operator) and its subcontractors (such as
the drilling contractor). For example, BP may have had stronger
safety culture incentives than the drilling subcontractor because BP
was more concerned about consumer backlash in its product
markets.1 4 ' On the other hand, if the subcontractor has more workers
on the rig than does the lease operator, then the subcontractor may
have stronger safety culture incentives. In either case, misaligned
incentives can cause investment in safety culture that from the
public's perspective is insufficient. This concern motivates recent
proposals for the government to mandate interfacing documents and
142
safety and environmental management systems.
Although the literature does not provide clear evidence of
conflicts of interest between lease operators and subcontractors in
deepwater drilling, such conflicts may not be a significant problem in
practice. First, if the lease operator has a much stronger incentive for
safety culture than the subcontractor, then the operator could actively
monitor the subcontractor. If monitoring proves too expensive, then
the firm could undertake the activity itself. Note that this is more
likely for larger firms, which might find it less costly to perform more
of the drilling-related tasks in-house.
Second, liability law makes it unlikely for incentives to become
significantly misaligned. As discussed further in the next Section, the
operator is liable for the costs of the spill, but it can sue the
subcontractors to recover at least some of those costs. 143 The liability
140. See supraPart II.A (discussing RiskMetrics Group's financial risk report on BP).
141. See generally supra Part III.A (exploring the importance of public perception to oil
companies and the potential for adverse effects in consumer demand and share prices for firms
seen as having poor environmental performance).
142. See infra Part IV.C.
143. See infra Part TV.A. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 specifies that federal liability for spillrelated damages falls on defined "responsible parties." See § 2701(32) (2006) (defining
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regime does not imply that the incentives of the two firms are
perfectly aligned, however, because the firm would have to establish
that the subcontractor was negligent, which may prove difficult in
practice. Nonetheless, the subcontractor faces potential lawsuits if it
causes an accident by underinvesting in safety culture.
Reputational effects may also play an important role in keeping
incentives aligned. The operator may observe the subcontractor's
safety culture directly from interacting repeatedly on different well
operations.1 4 4 The operator may rely upon its own experience or
industry-wide reputation to choose subcontractors. Furthermore,
reputation and repeated interactions could create strong safety
culture incentives for a subcontractor, because the subcontractor
might lose future business if it contributes to an accident.
IV. ANALYSIS OF POLICIES THAT AFFECT SAFETY CULTURE
In the previous Section, we examined the extent to which
existing laws and market forces provide adequate incentives for a
strong safety culture. We also identified two reasons why these factors
may not provide adequate incentives-lack of information and
misaligned incentives between shareholders and managers. These
reasons naturally give rise to potential rationales for government
intervention to improve organizational safety culture. Parts IV.A
through V.E discuss the effects on safety culture of five government
policies: liability, financial responsibility, government oversight,
mandatory insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. Part IV.F discusses
interactions between the policies. Part IV.G examines the role of
corporate governance policies. Finally, Part IV.H summarizes the
main features of these policies, and Part IV.I lists the main findings
from the preceding discussion. Our policy recommendations are
reserved for Part V.
The following discussion focuses on the effect of the policies on
safety culture. We do not consider the broader policy question of
whether to allow drilling at all and instead assume that decision has
already been made in favor of drilling. Nor do we consider
compensation issues related to liability. Setting a liability cap below
worst-case social damages means either that victims of a spill will not
be compensated or that the public will compensate the victims via
responsible parties); § 2702(a) (generally limiting liability under the statute to responsible
parties). But see § 2702(d) (extending liability to third parties under certain circumstances).
144. See Kenneth S. Corts & Jasjit Singh, The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract
Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling,20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230, 230-31 (2004).
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higher taxes. 145 This is a central issue to oil-spill policy, but it is
beyond the scope of this Article.
A. Liability
While firms bear damage to equipment and loss of valuable
hydrocarbons as costs of spills, whether they also bear the associated
environmental and economic costs depends on the legal regime. An
important method by which firms are made to internalize the
environmental and economic costs associated with a spill-and are
therefore incentivized to invest in preventing or reducing damages-is
tort liability. In the event of a spill, public and private claimants can
sue firms that spill ("responsible parties") and seek recovery of
economic or natural resources damages. 146 These suits may sometimes
be brought under (common) tort law or under federal or state
statutes. 147 In addition to litigation to recover damages, state and
federal government agencies might bring administrative, civil, or
criminal charges against a responsible party and seek to impose a fine
or other nonmonetary sanction (such as debarment or probation).
The possibility of such legal actions creates an incentive for a
responsible party to adopt a stronger safety culture to reduce the
probability and severity of a spill. The greater the liability exposure,
the greater the extent to which firms internalize costs and the greater
the incentive for a strong safety culture. Part II concluded that
policies should be calibrated to internalize the social cost of a spill.
Therefore, for the purpose of promoting the socially desirable level of
safety culture, a firm's potential liability under the law should equal
the expected social harm of the worst-case spill. 148 We note that
49
liability includes administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions.
145. Krupnick et al., supra note 97, at 23.
146. See 33 U.S.C § 2702(b)(2) (establishing liability for damages to real and personal
property, and to natural resources, among other classes of liability).
147. See, e.g., § 2702 (providing for federal liability for responsible parties); Oil Spill
Prevention and Response Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2479-80 (2011) (creating a cause of
action under Louisiana state statutory law for spill-related damages).
148. See infra Part V.I.
149. The firm's total liability should not exceed the expected social harm, as this could
induce more than the socially optimal level of safety culture resulting in firms taking costly
precautions beyond what society deems appropriate. See Mark A. Cohen, Optimal Enforcement
Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-AgentModel with Moral Hazard, 30
J.L. & ECON. 23, 27-32 (1987) [hereinafter Cohen, Optimal Enforcement], for an analysis of the
optimal government penalty for preventing oil spills. While this penalty is generally higher than
the social harm, as it must take into account the probability of detection, in the case of a
catastrophic spill where detection is certain, the penalty should just equal the social harm. From
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1. Fundamentals of Oil-Spill Liability Law
In practice, three factors limit the amount a responsible party
would pay after a spill, which limits the safety culture incentive that
liability creates. The first is that legal costs may prevent some of the
harmed individuals from suing. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
("OPA") 150 is the primary statute governing liability for spills,
although it explicitly does not preempt state law (or other federal
laws). 151 As a result, plaintiffs can file suits seeking recovery of spill
damages either in federal district court under the OPA or in state
court under common law or applicable state statutory law. 152 However,
petroleum exploration, production, and transportation are complex
industries with a large number of firms, complex contractual
relationships, and advanced technology understood only by experts.
These factors can make litigation over damages claims very complex
and costly.
To reduce this complexity, oil-spill liability law generally uses
channeling and strict liability. Both mechanisms have strong
153
foundations in the economic theory of enforcement literature.
Channeling is the identification, before litigation, of a
particular party that will be the defendant in an action to recover
spill-related damages. Since drilling operations typically involve
several partners and contractors, it might be difficult in the absence of
channeling provisions to identify which party to sue in the event of a
spill. The OPA makes the holder (or holders) of the drilling permit the
responsible party (or parties) for spills from offshore platforms. 154 In
addition to simplifying litigation, channeling creates incentives for a
responsible party to select and monitor partners and subcontractors

an efficiency standpoint, this analysis is no different under criminal law-although other goals
such as punishment or incapacitation might come into play under criminal law. See Mark A.
Cohen, Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy, in INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 1999/2000, supra note 111, at 44, 46-47.
150. 33 U.S.C. § 2701.
151. Id. § 2701. Because of this nonpreemption clause, the OPA sets a liability floor, not a
ceiling. Id. § 2718(a). States can deviate upward, but not downward: they can implement higher
liability caps (or none at all) or higher financial responsibility requirements, but cannot go lower.

Id.
152. The reasons why a plaintiff might choose one venue over another are complex and
largely beyond the scope of this analysis, but they include recovery beyond the liability limits in
the OPA and access to the channeling and strict liability provisions of federal law. See discussion
infra text accompanying notes 153-57.
153. See Cohen, Optimal Enforcement, supra note 149 (discussing optimal enforcement and
citing enforcement literature).
154. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32).
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with care, since the responsible party is ultimately responsible for
damages claims. Channeling does not prevent the responsible party
from recovering damages from other parties, such as lease partners or
contractors, in a separate legal action.
Strict liability plays an important role in reducing legal costs.
In suits seeking compensation for spill-related damages under the
OPA and some state statutes, plaintiffs need not show that the
defendant was negligent. 155 Plaintiffs must show that they suffered
some damage (economic damage, physical injury, or natural resources
damage) and that this damage was caused by a spill by the
responsible party. 156 Whether that firm is "at fault" or took care to
prevent the spill is not relevant. Strict liability therefore has the
advantage of greatly simplifying litigation and reducing the cost to the
government in particular. Generally speaking, legal scholars argue
that strict liability is appropriate where it is easy to identify in
157 in the case of
advance which party can most readily avoid damages;
158
spills, this is almost certainly the responsible party.
Together, channeling and strict liability can simplify spillrelated litigation and reduce legal costs. This increases firms' expected
liability as reduced costs for plaintiffs make more suits possible.
Litigation ensuing from large spills remains highly complex, however,
in part because of the number of victims (and therefore plaintiffs).
Class-action lawsuits reduce the cost of litigation but are still very
expensive and may take a long time. This complexity and the
associated costs and burden on the judicial system have driven efforts,
such as the $20 billion fund administered by the Gulf Coast Claims
155. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (establishing liability for any responsible party for any
discharge of oil in the relevant area). No mention of negligence or other standard is made here or
in § 2703 (defenses) or § 2704 (limits). The only roles for a negligence inquiry under the OPA are
to determine whether "gross" negligence has occurred, in which case liability caps are not
applicable, and to determine whether the claimant caused the incident by his own gross
negligence. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b), 2704(c)(1)(A).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-(b).
157. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Auoider,
78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1338, 1342 (1992). Farnsworth has an excellent discussion of this issue for
the general reader. WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT
THE LAW 48-49 (2007).

158. Strict liability also creates incentives to search for better safety technologies than a
negligence standard because a negligence standard would only impose penalties if current
standards of care are not adopted. On the other hand, if under strict liability the potential
penalty from a large spill is so great that a small firm would declare bankruptcy, strict liability
might cause such a firm to take less care than under a negligence standard. See Cohen, Optimal
Enforcement, supra note 149, at 31, 33-34; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1980). As we discuss in Section IV.B, sufficient financial responsibility
requirements should prevent this from occurring. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
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Facility, to satisfy damages claims without litigation. 159 In addition,
litigation under state common law does not benefit from either
channeling or strict liability; plaintiffs must name a defendant and,
generally, show negligence in order to recover.
2. Liability Caps
Besides legal costs, there is a second limitation on a responsible
party's expected liability: statutory liability caps. 160 For example, for
offshore facilities like the Deepwater Horizon, the OPA imposes a
liability cap for spill damages at $75 million. The OPA also limits
liability in the case of natural disaster, war, or certain actions taken
16 1
by third parties.
The OPA's liability caps are not as firm in practice as a cursory
reading of the statute would indicate, however.' 62 First, they are
qualified by the statute itself: OPA caps do not apply to cleanup costs
and are waived in cases of gross negligence or a violation of applicable
regulations. 63 The latter exception seems quite broad; many spills are
likely to involve some violation, and if a violation, no matter how
trivial, is discovered, then the cap is removed.
Second, the OPA does not preempt state or other federal
1
64
laws. Table 1 summarizes state laws regarding oil-spill liability. To
the extent that these laws do not include damages caps, a case
brought under them (or under common law) is not subject to OPA
caps. Of the Gulf states, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas
either do not have specific statutes governing oil-spill liability or have
statutes that do not set caps on liability. 165 However, suits to recover
159. Associated Press, BP OKs $20 Billion Escrow Fund, Halts Dividend, MSNBC.COM, June
16,
2010,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37725103/ns/disaster in the.gulf/t/bp-oks-billionescrow-fund-halts-dividend/ ('The use of the BP escrow fund is intended to avoid a repeat of the
painful aftermath of 1989 Exxon Valdez oil disaster in Alaska, when the fight over money
dragged out in courts over roughly two decades.").
160. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (providing for limits on liability).
161. Id. § 2703(a).
162. Nathan Richardson, DeepwaterHorizon and the Patchwork of Oil Spill Liability Law 3
(Resources for the Future, May 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/rffldocuments/RFF-BCKRichardson-OilLiability.pdf.
163. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c).
164. Id. § 2718(a).
165. See Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2451 (2011)
(defining scope of cause of action for spill-related damages in Lousiana); see also Jonathan K.
Waldron, Gulf Coast Escrow Fund Claims Procedure Established for the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill Versus Remedies Available Under Current Law, A.B.A. ENVTL. & ENERGY BUS. L. REP. 3
(2010), availableat http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL400000pub/newsletter/201009/
waldron.pdf (detailing spill liability laws in other Gulf states).
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spill damages in these states' courts may not benefit from the
channeling and strict liability provisions available under federal law,
making litigation more costly and recovery more difficult. Plaintiffs
therefore face a difficult choice.
TABLE 1. MAJOR PROVISIONS OF STATE OIL-SPILL LIABILITY LAWS
1 66
IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
State

Liability for
spill damages

Notes

Strict

Cap

Florida

Y

N

Removal costs capped by statute;
damages not capped

Alabama
Mississippi

N
N

N
N

Common law negligence regime
Strict liability for removal costs;
negligence regime for damages

Louisiana

Y

Y

Cap at same level as the OPA

Texas

Y

N

Drilling firms' exposure to damages liability to private
plaintiffs167 is much greater under most states' laws than it is under
the OPA. In fact, two states-Texas and Florida-allow uncapped
strict liability for spill damages. 168 Louisiana does, however, cap
liability.1 6 9 The Louisiana Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act
mirrors the OPA in many respects, including its liability caps. 170 As a
result, damages to Louisiana residents and Louisiana natural
resources are subject to the liability caps in the two statutes. Private
plaintiffs will find it difficult or impossible to evade the effect of the
caps. To do so, they may have to show gross negligence or a regulatory
166. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2479; Waldron, supra note 165, at 3.
167. Despite OPA damages caps, the federal government can recover damages and cleanup
costs from responsible parties via a variety of other legal methods, including suit under other
statutes, civil penalties, or settlement under threat of criminal prosecution.
168. See Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011376.165 (West 2011); Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1991, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §
40.202 (West 2009).
169. See Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2451-30:2496
(2006).
170. See id. § 30:2479(A) (limiting liability for offshore facilities to removal costs plus $75
million).
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violation. Because so many drilling operations take place near
Louisiana, the state's cap may significantly lower the costs a
responsible party would pay after a spill.
The OPA caps are not binding in any Gulf state other than
Louisiana.17 1 Besides the possibility of lawsuits in state courts, the
government can use the threat of criminal or civil penalties to compel
a settlement regardless of OPA caps, a legal strategy used in the
Exxon Valdez spill.172 BP's decision to fund claims for victim
compensation, in lieu of litigation, up to levels far beyond the OPA
cap1 73 suggests that the firm believes the cap would not significantly
limit its liability, though this move may also be influenced by political
174
and public relations considerations.
On the other hand, liability caps do affect where plaintiffs sue
and may block plaintiffs' access to the favorable strict liability and
channeling provisions available in an OPA suit. In states like
Louisiana, where common law actions for spill damages are replaced
by state statutes with their own damages caps, recovery by private
plaintiffs beyond the caps may be difficult or impossible. Liability caps
may also restrict avenues available to plaintiffs and/or raise litigation
costs, reducing the number of cases firms must defend and the
amounts they must pay in settlements. Some types of damages may
also be recoverable only under federal maritime law (as modified by
the OPA) and not under state law. 1 75 Drilling firms' liability exposure
from these kinds of claims would be firmly limited by the OPA cap.
We conclude that although the federal liability cap is far below
worst-case damages from drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, the liability
caps in the OPA are not generally binding because of other provisions
in state and federal law. However, the caps do likely reduce the
aggregate expected damages payments from a spill to some degree
171. As described in the previous paragraph, only Louisiana has a statutory liability cap.
172. See Agreement and Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 CIV (D.
Alaska 1991) (settling criminal and civil penalties arising under the Clean Water Act and other
statutes).
173. The Clean Water Act, for example, provides for civil penalties of $1,000 per barrel of oil
spilled ($3,000 in cases of gross negligence). See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(7) (2006).
Estimates of the total volume of oil released in the DeepwaterHorizon spill vary, but assuming a
ballpark figure of five million barrels, Clean Water Act penalties could range from $5.5 billion to
$21.5 billion, or between 73 and 285 times greater than the $75 million OPA liability cap. Even if
settled for pennies on the dollar, such penalties could easily far exceed claims paid out under the
OPA-though if gross negligence is established, as is necessary for increased civil penalties, no
cap would apply under the OPA either.
174. See supra Part III.
175. See Waldron, supra note 165, at 3 ("[O]il spills offshore have generally been treated as
federal maritime torts.").
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(unless they are waived, as BP has allegedly done),
corresponding effects on safety incentives (see Finding 2).

with

3. Social Costs
The third limitation of liability is that the public may not be
able to recover the full social cost of the spill. Certain types of lawsuits
are precluded due to the difficulty of establishing proximate cause; for
example, these include actions to recover public health costs or to
176
receive payment for mental anguish to economic victims of a spill.
In the case of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, claims are limited to
certain economic costs. 177 Firms therefore do not appear to fully
internalize social costs when choosing safety cultures. We note that
this would be the case even if liability caps were removed entirely as
liability system itself, not in
this limitation is inherent in the 17tort
8
liability caps or any specific policy.
B. FinancialResponsibility
Up to this point, we have assumed that responsible parties pay
any damages awards made by courts and that exposure to the full risk
of liability will influence safety decisions. But in reality, firms'
resources are not unlimited. The ability to declare bankruptcy limits a
firm's exposure to risk. Specifically, a responsible party that is too
small to adequately compensate victims of a worst-case spill lacks
incentives to make sufficient investments in safety: there is no reason
to prevent spills that cause damages that exceed its ability to pay. The
remaining costs of the spill would then fall on spill victims or the
public at large. In fact, this consideration suggests that firms have an
incentive to be small to avoid the costs that a larger firm would incur
by adopting a stronger safety culture. This problem-concerning the
judgment-proof tortfeasor-is not unique to oil spills, but it is
particularly salient given the large costs of the spills. The possibility of
bankruptcy thus implies that, in the absence of insurance, liability
from a spill creates an incentive for a safety culture that is limited by
the value of the firm's assets (see Finding 3).

176. See Krupnick et al., supra note 97, at 29-36.
177. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FINAL RULES GOVERNING PAYMENT OPTIONS,
ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT METHODOLOGY (2011),
available at http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/FINALRULES.pdf (identifying the types of
economic damages that will be covered).
178. Krupnick et al., supra note 97, at 37-43.
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A partial solution to this problem is to require a demonstration
of financial responsibility ("FR"). 179 The basic idea is simple: to engage
in activities that expose outside parties to risks, a firm must
demonstrate that it has sufficient resources-either its own (selfinsurance) or third-party insurance coverage-to compensate those
parties in the event of an accident.
The OPA establishes FR for petroleum firms. For offshore

facilities, the statute requires that firms make a $35 million
demonstration, subject to increase by the President up to a maximum
of $150 million. 80° Regulations of the Minerals Management Service
("MMS," now the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement, "BOEMRE") include guidelines for determining the
necessary level of FR, based on the estimated worst-case discharge
from offshore facilities. 181 The highest level of FR demonstration-the
statutory maximum of $150 million-is required for facilities whose
worst-case discharge volume exceeds 105,000 barrels. 182 A firm's FR
demonstration is equal to the highest level required by any one of its
wells.183

In principle, the FR requirement for a given activity should be
sufficiently high to cover the costs of the worst-case spill associated
with that activity. If requirements are lower, then the judgment-proof
spiller problem is mitigated but not eliminated. Offshore drilling firms
capable of demonstrating only $35 million to $150 million of FR are
unable to cover damages associated with spills that exceed these
levels. These firms therefore lack liability-driven incentives to invest
in preventing such spills. Limiting FR in the OPA to $35 million to
$150 million is broadly consistent with capping liability at $75 million,
however.184
179. See James Boyd, FinancialResponsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding
and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise? 3-11 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 0142, 2001), available at http://www.rff.orgdocuments/RFF-DP-01-42.pdf.
180. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c) (2006). Note that firms with more than one facility need show
financial responsibility for only the facility with the highest requirement. A firm with ten
offshore drilling platforms, for example, must demonstrate only $35 million, not $350 million.
181. BOEMRE Oil Spill Financial Responsibility for Offshore Facilities, 30 C.F.R. §§ 250,
253 (2011).
182. Id. § 253.13.
183. Id.
184. For vessels over three hundred tons, the OPA links financial responsibility
requirements to liability caps. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(a). It is not clear why the statute does not do so
for offshore facilities. Because the liability cap for such facilities is fixed at $75 million but the
financial responsibility requirement can be anywhere in the $35 million to $150 million range,
the requirements could be insufficient. The default $35 million cap seems especially problematic:
it fails to deal with the problem that FR is designed to address. A firm with, say, the means to
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But, as discussed above, the actual liability for a firm drilling
in the Gulf of Mexico is potentially far greater than the liability cap in
the OPA.18 5 The result is that current FR requirements are far lower
than both the expected damages associated with a worst-case spill and
the expected liability associated with such a spill. In this sense, it is
fortunate that BP, and not a smaller firm, was the responsible party
for the Deepwater Horizon spill.186 Many smaller drilling firms would
have been unable to cover the multibillion-dollar liability and would
have gone bankrupt. Such firms would therefore have had reduced ex
ante incentives to prevent large spills and would have left victims
uncompensated if such a spill had occurred-exactly the problems that
FR requirements set at the appropriate level would avoid (see Finding
4).
Firms too small to meet the FR requirement are not permitted
to drill. Consequently, an increase in FR requirements could result in
greater market share for major oil companies if smaller firms exit
because they cannot demonstrate FR directly or because they cannot
remain profitable while paying premiums for insurance that would
help them demonstrate FR. For example, sixteen of the thirty-two
firms drilling in deep water in the Gulf of Mexico in 2009 had market
values below $30 billion, 8 7 which is likely the low end of the external
costs of the Deepwater Horizon spill.188 The resulting decrease in
competition could lead to (slightly) higher prices in oil markets and
lower licensing fees. We view this cost as unlikely to be as great as the
cost to society of the risk that a small firm will cause a spill whose
damages far exceed the value of the firm's assets. A conclusive answer,
however, is not possible without empirical study (see Finding 5).
cover $50 million in damages would be permitted to operate a facility, but unable to cover even
capped liability. If financial responsibility were raised to $150 million, firms would have to
demonstrate double what they would have to pay based on the cap; this is probably good for the
public, however, because firms are very likely to have liabilities beyond the cap.
185. See supraPart IV.A.
186. Note, however, that two other firms-Anadarko and MOEX-are part owners, and
therefore co-responsible parties, in the Macondo well. These firms have not waived liability caps,
but they are significantly smaller than BP. It is as yet unclear whether their lack of resources
will ultimately limit recovery.
187. Lucija Muehlenbachs, Mark Cohen & Todd Gerarden, Preliminary Empirical
Assessment of Offshore Production Platforms in the Gulf of Mexico 8-9 (Res. for the Future,
Discussion Paper No. 10-66, 2011), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-10-66.pdf.
188. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 113, at 3 (estimating that the total social costs associated
with the DeepwaterHorizon spill could range as high as $60 to $100 billion). However, not all of
the total social costs are likely to be borne by the responsible parties. See BP P.L.C., supra note
114, at 1 (estimating BP's cost through the end of the fourth quarter of 2010 to be $40.9 billion).
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C. Government Oversight
Liability laws and financial responsibility requirements
(discussed in the previous two sections) impose costs on firms that
spill oil after an accident has occurred. In contrast, we now consider
two policies that impose costs prior to a spill-government oversight
(this Section) and mandatory insurance (Part IV.D). In addition to
imposing costs prior to a spill, both of these policies involve thirdparty monitoring prior to a spill.
1. Monitoring
There are several reasons monitoring could be desirable. First,
if the results of monitoring are made public, monitoring could increase
information available to stock market investors, who in turn could
place greater pressure on firms to adopt stronger safety cultures (see
Part III. C).
Second, information disclosed in monitoring could inform
regulators and the public about the efficacy of a policy regime, prior to
a spill. Because major spills are so rare, it is not possible to evaluate
policies aimed at reducing the risk of a major spill by observing their
effect on the probability or severity of a spill. This consideration is
particularly important because even if liability and FR requirements
cause social costs to be internalized fully, firms may not adopt the
socially optimal level of safety culture given agency problems within
the firm (see Part III). Monitoring and disclosure could reveal whether
this is occurring.
The third benefit of monitoring is that a qualified third-party
monitor could be an important check on industry practices. Industry
might go many years without another major spill, in which case
complacency could lead to a gradual weakening of safety culture.
Third-party monitors could make this less likely. Note that these
benefits pertain to both government oversight and insurance, but
there are important differences between the two that are discussed
below.
2. Safety and Environmental Management Systems
Government oversight can take many forms.18 9 We define
stronger regulatory oversight as more intense monitoring combined
189. The distinction between prescriptive and performance-based regulations is discussed in
Scarlett et al., supra note 28, at 5-6.
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with the threat of civil fines or criminal prosecution, which should
lead to additional precautions and a lower ex-ante-expected
probability of catastrophe.
Stronger oversight has direct and indirect effects on safety
culture. Via fines or prosecution, it directly raises the cost of failing to
adopt a strong safety culture. Indirectly, if the government discloses
the results of its monitoring, then investors could learn about the
company's weak efforts and exert pressure.
One example of a government oversight policy that could
directly affect safety culture is a safety and environmental
management system ("SEMS"). In October 2010, BOEMRE issued a
rule that requires firms to use a SEMS. 190 The SEMS required by
BOEMRE is the same as that recommended by the American
Petroleum Institute. 191 Many firms operating in the Gulf of Mexico,
including BP, already use a SEMS or something similar to it.192
As specified in the regulation, a SEMS contains twelve
features, many of them discussed in Part II; they include management
of change, training, investigation of incidents, and audits of safety and
environmental management programs. 193 Although not all safety
experts agree, we consider a firm's adoption of a SEMS as indicating
an increase in safety culture.
In this Section, we do not evaluate the effect of a SEMS on the
risk of a major accident and assume that, when properly adopted, it
reduces the probability or severity. Instead, we focus on the effect on
safety culture of a government-mandated SEMS. Prior to the
regulation, some firms may not have used a SEMS because of a lack of
information or insufficient incentives; we discuss both possibilities in
turn. Some firms may not have known how to implement a SEMS or
about the benefits of the approach. We do not consider this relevant to
190. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 30 C.F.R. §§
250.1900-29 (2011).
191. 30 C.F.R. § 250.198(h)(80) (incorporating by reference the entirety of the American
Petroleum Institute's Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental
Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities (API RP 75)).
192. See, e.g., BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 228 ("Safety and environmental
management systems are used in similar forms in other parts of the world and many credit them
with the better safety records achieved outside U.S. waters (see Chapter 3). Beginning early in
the last decade, the trade organization steadfastly resisted MMS's efforts to require all
companies to demonstrate that they have a complete safety and environmental management
system in addition to meeting more traditional, prescriptive regulations-despite the fact that
this is the direction taken in other countries in response to the Piper Alpha rig explosion in the
late 1980s. Indeed, many operators in the Gulf were used to this safety-based approach on their
rigs in the North Sea and Canada.").
193. 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.1900-29.
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drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, however, particularly for large firms
that operate in other regions of the world, such as Norway and the
United Kingdom, where a SEMS (or an equivalent) is required. Lack
of information could be an issue for smaller firms, but we do not have
evidence in either direction.
We distinguish between government-mandated SEMS and the
actual adoption of SEMS and a stronger safety culture. In theory, a
firm could comply with a government-mandated SEMS on paper
without significantly changing its safety culture, particularly if the
legal requirements of a SEMS are vague.
Thus, requiring a SEMS could cause firms to adopt a stronger
safety culture, but not necessarily. Consider a simple theoretical
model in which it costs c to adopt a SEMS. The benefit, b, of the SEMS
is a lower expected cost of a catastrophe, which depends on the
liability cap and other factors. Before the Deepwater Horizon spill, as
firms weighed costs and benefits, some firms presumably decided that
the costs outweighed the benefits and did not adopt a SEMS. After the
Deepwater Horizon spill, with a government-mandated SEMS, the
firm can choose to adopt a stronger safety culture, or it can pay a cost,
f, to satisfy the regulatory requirements without actually changing its
behaviors. In other words, it is possible to fool the government into
thinking that the firm has adopted a SEMS. But stronger government
oversight raises f because it becomes more difficult to satisfy the
SEMS requirements without adopting a safety culture. Examples of
stronger oversight include hiring better-trained monitors, using thirdparty monitors, or adopting more specific requirements for the SEMS.
Therefore, the change in safety culture depends on b, c, and f: if b > c +
f, the firm adopts a stronger safety culture. Mandating SEMS could
have no effect on safety culture if f is relatively small, but stronger
government oversight of the SEMS would raise the likelihood that the
firm adopts a stronger safety culture. Thus, changes in government
oversight beyond mandating a SEMS are necessary; specifically, the
benefit of adopting the SEMS must exceed the cost of evading it (see
Finding 6).
D. Mandatory Insurance
Currently, there is no insurance requirement under the OPA;
insurance is one means of satisfying the FR requirement but is not
required. Many large drilling firms self-insure through captive
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insurers. 194 In principle, the FR requirement could be replaced by
mandating third-party insurance.
Although proof of FR may serve a similar role as insurance in
ensuring that victims are compensated, neither by itself may provide
adequate incentives for firms to implement the socially desirable level
of safety culture. First, as we have discussed, principal-agent
problems within the firm might reduce the internal incentives for
individuals within the firm to act in the firm's best interest. Second,
the fact that a firm has purchased insurance creates a new problem:
the firm has an incentive to shirk on safety because it is now
financially covered in the case of an oil spill. To overcome this moral
hazard problem, insurers might institute risk-based pricing so that
firms with identifiably higher risk exposures pay higher rates
(creating an incentive to reduce risk).195 Numerous other mechanisms
are available, including coinsurance, deductibles, and direct
monitoring of firm behavior. The level of monitoring and the overall
effect of insurance on safety culture depend on the liability cap, as
discussed in Part IV.F. Requiring insurance thus provides the
additional benefit of third-party monitoring, which should be
compared to government monitoring.
1. Comparison of Government and Insurance Monitoring
As with government oversight, a third-party insurance monitor
can assist in overcoming some of the principal-agent conflicts inherent
in the owner-manager relationship. Third-party monitoring by
insurance companies may be redundant if government monitoring and
enforcement are effective.
For two reasons, however, third-party insurance can provide a
mechanism for monitoring beyond that of the government or the firm
itself. First, because of the government's lower pay scales, the private
insurance industry could attract better-qualified monitors. Second,
exposure to liability creates a strong incentive for the insurance
company to properly monitor that is not present with government
monitoring. There is evidence that the insurance industry does play
194. See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, THE OFFSHORE

OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY REPORT ON

INSURANCE - PART ONE, at 6 n.2 (2010), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/
default/files/documentsfFinance%2OReport%2OPart%200ne.Oct 5_4%20PMr2.pdf (noting that
BP established a "captive" insurance company, which funds that company's property damage and
business interruption losses).
195. This is the approach taken in the nuclear industry through an industry-sponsored selfregulatory system. See BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 238 (stating that the Nuclear
Electric Insurance Limited sets insurance premiums based on its assessment of risk).
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this role in the oil-drilling industry 96 and that government monitoring
efforts have been less than adequate. For example, Scarlett et al. cite
MMS's own admission that, despite inspection and enforcement
efforts, it "could find no discernible improvements in safety
performance trends" and had "limited methods to verify and document
197
industry compliance with the regulatory performance standards."'
On the other hand, if the liability caps are low, this monitoring
incentive may not be very strong for private insurance. An additional
advantage of government monitoring is that the results of the
monitoring can be made public, which may be more difficult to require
in a private insurance regime.
Whether the government or the insurance industry is
ultimately the more effective monitor of drilling activity is an
empirical question that is beyond the scope of our analysis. The former
depends on vigilant government enforcement; the latter relies upon
market forces, which should be adequate if the potential liability is
sufficiently high. Whichever approach is ultimately chosen, it is clear
that unless the government significantly increases its own oversight
capacity and monitoring activities, a requirement for third-party
insurance will likely result in more effective monitoring than
government oversight.
2. Potential Challenges to Mandating Private Insurance
There are two reasons why a third-party insurance
requirement might not work. First, monitoring is expensive, and it is
difficult to observe a firm's efforts to reduce the risk of a spill.198 The
cost of monitoring could be too high for both insurance companies and
drilling companies to remain profitable.
The second reason why requiring third-party insurance might
not be a viable solution is that insurance markets may be unable to
raise adequate capital to insure against the potential liability. Indeed,
we note that the industry argued this point in congressional hearings
196. See Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, supra note 194, at 6-10 (discussing how insurance
companies insure firms engaged in energy exploration and production and the financial risks
involved).
197. Scarlett et al., supra note 28, at 31.
198. While we are unaware of evidence on insurance-industry monitoring costs, the
BOEMRE reported that in FY 2009 it had fifty-five inspectors in the Gulf of Mexico who go
offshore by helicopter every day. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement, Enforcement Measures: Inspections, GULF OF MEXICO OCS REGION,
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/laws/enforc.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2011).
This level of effort only allows for an inspection of oil production facilities about once a year.
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shortly after the Deepwater Horizon spill, when Congress was
considering raising the liability cap. Robert Hartwig of the Insurance
Information Institute testified on June 9, 2010, that it would be
impossible for energy insurers or reinsurers to raise $10 billion of
coverage. He cited several reasons, including the difficulty of
underwriting for unlikely, but extremely severe events that are
difficult to predict. 199
Nevertheless, the insurance industry has a history of adapting
to new liability caps and attracting the necessary capital to provide a
market where demand exists. 200 Current industry concerns that
increasing liability exposure will make firms uninsurable seem
unfounded based on prior experience and on a recent proposal by
Munich Re that may provide insurance of up to $10 billion to $20
billion on a rig-by-rig basis (just three months after the industry
testified it would be impossible to insure at that level). 20 1 We note,
however, that the levels of insurance that would be required for
deepwater drilling under our recommended liability cap and financial
responsibility requirements are likely to exceed even this amount, and
further study of this issue is warranted.
E. Risk-Based Fees
The central economic problem regarding safety is that
managers (and perhaps shareholders) may not choose the socially
desirable level of safety culture -because the social benefit of reducing
spill damages is not fully internalized. Raising the liability cap and
FR requirement would help, but as noted above, there may still be
damages that are not recoverable.
An insurance pool, currently under consideration as a means of
preventing small firms from exiting under mandatory insurance, could
actually exacerbate the problem. 20 2 Suppose that an insurance pool is

199. Hearing on the Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills Under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statute Before the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure,
111th Cong. 22 (2010) (statement of Robert P. Hartwig, President and Economist, Insurance
Information Institute).
200. Boyd provides evidence of similar unfounded concerns raised by the insurance industry
during debates over OPA and CERCLA reauthorization. Boyd, supranote 179, at 34-38.
201. Press Release, Munich RE, Munich RE Develops New Insurance Solution for Oil
Catastrophes (Sept. 12, 2010), available at http://www.munichre.com/enlmedia-relations/press
_releases/2010/2010 09j 12press release.aspx.
202. See Tom Bergin, Oil Companies Plan New U.S. Oil Spill Fund, REUTERS, Oct. 7, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6961V220101007
(stating that some
analysts have predicted that the oil spill could cause a shakeout with smaller companies being

1902

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:6:1853

constructed in which a firm pays a premium in proportion to the
number of wells it has. This premium structure creates a classic moral
hazard problem in which, compared with the status quo, there is a
stronger incentive to (1) adopt a weaker safety culture and (2) drill
wells that the firm knows, ex ante, are riskier.
There is another way to raise the benefit of adopting a strong
safety culture without creating the above perverse incentives.
Imposing risk-based drilling fees would reduce the profits of a firm
that does not have a strong safety culture. A regulator, insurance
company, or industry organization would rate the level of safety at
each well. Under an insurance pool, the responsible party would pay a
premium that is proportional to the number of wells and the safety
score at each operation. The premium could depend on the
subcontractors, which would encourage the operators to employ
subcontractors that also have strong safety cultures. This would
resolve potential conflicts of interest between the firm and
203
subcontractor.
Three issues would have to be addressed in a scheme with riskbased fees: measurement, transparency, and reporting. Ideally, the fee
would be based on the ex ante probability and severity of a spill from
each well. Estimating this probability is no small task and would
require intensive study. At the outset, it seems reasonable to set the
fee based on (1) the firm's past safety record; (2) observable
characteristics of the well (depth, pressure, etc.); and (3) the adoption
of certain safety culture policies (such as compensation schemes or
promotion criteria that reward safety). The fee would be updated
when more information became available-for example, using
subsequent data on a firm's safety record to change the weighting of
the components or add new components. Although estimating the ex
ante probability of a spill is extremely difficult, the same problem
arises with third-party insurance and government oversight. Thus,
the risk measurement problem is not unique to using risk-based fees.
An important question is whether the results of the safety
rating would be made public. Public disclosure would provide some of
the benefits of third-party monitoring. Such a disclosure policy,
however, would have to address concerns about the release of trade
secrets.

forced to sell up because new regulations force them to seek insurance coverage, which may be
either unobtainable or unaffordable).
203. See supra Part III.D.
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Clearly, firms would have an incentive to misreport-for
example, by hiding accidents. Again, this is not different from
monitoring under mandatory third-party insurance or stronger
government oversight (or if a firm links compensation to safety
outcomes). One way to address this problem is to impose fines or jail
time for misreporting. Alternatively, a firm could be given time to
address any problems it reports. If the problem is addressed to the
satisfaction of the regulator or auditor, the safety score would not
change. This would remove at least some of the disincentive to report
truthfully.
A final note regarding risk-based fees is that the approach
could easily be used for other institutions, such as fees for drilling
permits or for membership in the Marine Well Containment
Corporation ("MWCC"). Rather than requiring large firms to pay a
fixed fee to support the MWCC, fees could be based on each firm's
number of wells and the safety score at each well.
In summary, we find that risk-based fees would increase the
incentive for a stronger safety culture and could provide the benefits of
monitoring. The approach could be used in combination with other
policies, including an insurance pool or the MWCC (see Finding 7).
F. Policy Interactions
While we have identified liability, financial responsibility,
increased government monitoring, and mandatory insurance as
potential policy interventions to improve organizational safety culture,
these policies do not have completely independent effects. In
particular, important interactions between these policies must be
considered. The first is the relationship between liability and financial
responsibility, and the second is the relationship between liability and
insurance.
1. Interaction Between Liability and Financial Responsibility
Suppose that, for a given firm, there is a risk of, at most, one
major spill (Part V discusses the implications of relaxing this
assumption). If there were no possibility of bankruptcy, then raising
the liability cap would increase the firm's safety culture because it
would increase the financial risk of a spill. However, as discussed
above, if the value of a firm's assets is less than the liability cap, then
raising the cap would not affect its safety culture unless the FR
requirement were simultaneously raised; the firm would have to
acquire additional assets (or purchase insurance) to continue drilling.
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Similarly, raising the FR requirement while maintaining the
liability cap may not affect safety culture. Firms would have to hold
more assets to drill, but the benefit of adopting a stronger safety
culture would be unchanged because firms are not exposed to any
additional risk (see Finding 8).
2. Interaction Between Liability and Mandatory Insurance
A mandatory insurance requirement complements liability in a
similar manner as FR does. If liability is capped and there is no FR
requirement (or it is lower than the cap), then small firms would have
little incentive to adopt a strong safety culture because they could lose
only the value of their assets. In this case, requiring firms to have
insurance up to the liability cap could increase the incentive for
adopting a safety culture. For larger firms (for which bankruptcy is
less likely), the incentive created by raising the liability cap and
requiring third-party insurance is more difficult to characterize. In
principle, the moral hazard problem created by insurance could result
in a weaker safety culture; further study of this question is warranted.
As Part IV.D discusses, the insurance company would have to
monitor to ensure that the firm's safety culture and other decisions
did not expose the insurance company to excessive risk. This
relationship between liability and insurance is really a special version
of the relationship between liability and FR, since third-party
insurance is one option available for firms to demonstrate FRthough, as described above, insurance can provide a monitoring
function that FR alone cannot (see Finding 9).
The level of monitoring depends on the liability cap and other
factors, however. A low liability cap could provide only a small
incentive for private insurance monitoring. We note that government
monitoring is not linked to the liability cap in this way.
G. Corporate Governance Policies
As discussed earlier, corporate governance is a broad concept
that includes disclosure policies, board composition and duties, and
executive compensation. From a shareholder perspective, the role of
government policy is to help bridge the gap created by the principalagent relationship inherent between shareholders and managers.
Thus, to the extent shareholders have inadequate information and/or
inadequate mechanisms to align manager incentives with shareholder
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preferences, government intervention might be warranted. 2 4 Further,
we argue that a strong safety culture might be in the interest of
shareholders. Thus, corporate governance reforms might lead to
improvements in a firm's safety culture. Of course, to the extent
shareholder interests are not aligned with society's interests in
ensuring a strong safety culture, corporate governance policies will
have little impact on socially desirable behavior.
Sarbanes-Oxley and various SEC guidelines already require
publicly traded firms to disclose risks that might have a material
impact on firm profitability. 20 5 Potentially, more targeted disclosure
requirements focusing on the risk of catastrophic spills could force
firms to provide details on spill prevention and containment plans,
research and development ("R&D") expenditures, and other relevant
information. While shareholder pressure is possible, it is not clear that
increased disclosure requirements will translate into significant
shareholder pressure and/or changes in firm behavior. On the other
hand, more prescriptive corporate governance measures, such as
requiring a board-level environmental or safety committee, personally
guaranteeing safety procedures by top management, or tying
executive compensation to safety, all have the potential to affect firm
behavior directly. Of course, to the extent shareholders previously
lacked information on the likelihood and/or potential catastrophic
consequences of a large oil spill, the market might impose many of
these requirements without any government intervention.
We also note the potential downside associated with these
increased governance requirements to the extent firms find that the
cost of going (or remaining) public increases. 20 6 In fact, these
requirements could be counter-productive if they encourage firms to
retreat into a less transparent mode. Thus, whether government
policies targeting corporate governance practices are a socially
desirable mechanism to improve the safety culture of oil-drilling firms
is an open question-one on which we do not have adequate data to
assess. We do note, however, that a significant share of deepwater and
ultra-deepwater production is conducted by firms that are either

204. See supra Part 1II.C.
205. See, e.g., SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (2011) (requiring disclosure of
material information related to compliance with environmental regulations and other
environmental costs); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(1) (2006) (requiring
certain issuers of securities to disclose material information to the public "on a rapid and current
basis.., in plain English").
206. See supraPart WV.G.
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privately held or not listed on U.S. stock exchanges. 20 7 Hence, any
policies designed to promote good governance practices among U.S.
publicly traded firms will have the unintended consequence of giving a
cost advantage to the privately held, foreign-owned or governmentowned oil producers.
H. Summary of Policies
Table 2 summarizes the features of the five policy changes that
would increase safety culture incentives. The first column indicates
whether the policy affects a drilling firm's costs before or after a spill.
The second column shows whether the policy reduces the likelihood
that a firm declares bankruptcy without covering the full costs of the
spill-if this is the case, then the policy has a smaller effect on safety
culture at small firms. The final columns show how the policy affects
monitoring, followed by its potential to create a moral hazard problem.
See the previous sections for explanations of each entry.

207. See Muehlenbachs et al., supra note 187, at 34 tbl.A1 (showing that of the twenty
companies who were lease holders or operators in deep and ultra-deep water in 2010, three are
privately held and seven are publicly traded firms based outside the United States).
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF SAFETY CULTURE POLICIES
Policy proposal

Does the policy...
Affect the
firm's costs
before or
after spill?

Prevent small
firms from
avoiding spill
costs?

Increase
external
monitoring?

Create
moral
hazard?

Raise or
eliminate
liability caps

After

No

No

No

Raise
ReirentsFR
requirements

Before

Yes

No

No

Require thirdparty insurance

Before and
after

Yes

Yes

Yes

Before

No

Yes

No

Before

No

Yes

No

Before

No

Yes

No

Implement
more stringent
government
regulation
Introduce riskbased fees
Corporate
governance
policies

I. Summary of Findings
This Section summarizes our findings on policy and safety
culture.
Finding 1: Tort liability and the OPA require firms to pay for
cleanup costs and economic and natural resource damages. When
firms make decisions related to safety culture, their cost-benefit
analysis for adopting a stronger safety culture should reflect the
expected social harm from a spill.
Finding 2: Caps on spill liability in federal law are below
worst-case damages from drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, although the
liability caps in the OPA are not generally binding because of other
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provisions in state and federal law. Caps do limit firms' liability,
directly for some types of damage and indirectly by restricting
avenues available to plaintiffs and raising plaintiffs' litigation costs,
which reduces the number of cases firms must defend and the
amounts they must pay in settlements.
Finding 3: Liability raises the benefit of adopting a strong
safety culture, as long as the expected damages payout, plus other
possible costs (e.g., legal costs), is no greater than the firm's assets.
Finding 4: Current FR requirements are well below expected
damages from a worst-case spill and therefore are insufficient to
prevent firms from engaging in activities whose risks they cannot
bear. The safety incentives generated by liability for small firms are
limited, in many cases dramatically limited.
Finding 5: Significant increases in liability caps and FR
requirements may force some small firms out of the Gulf because they
will be unable to afford liability insurance. Competition may decline,
(slightly) raising oil prices and reducing lease fees. These effects are
likely outweighed by small firms' failure to fully internalize social
costs.
Finding 6: Without adequate monitoring and enforcement,
firms may be able to satisfy the regulatory requirements without
changing their safety culture. In that case, the adoption of a safety
culture would depend not on the regulatory requirements, but rather
on other policy and economic forces that affect safety culture.
Finding 7: Risk-based fees directly raise the benefit of adopting
a strong safety culture and could be implemented in such a way that
includes third-party monitoring.
Finding 8: Raising the liability cap without changing the FR
requirement would not affect safety culture at a firm whose asset
value is less than the cap. For such a firm, both the liability cap and
the FR requirement would have to be raised to increase the incentive
for a strong safety culture.
Finding 9: Increasing the liability cap and mandating
insurance up to the new cap would increase the incentive for safety
culture, similar to jointly raising the liability cap and FR requirement.
Finding 10: Mandatory third-party insurance (as opposed to
self-insurance or the use of captive insurers) may be an effective
substitute for government monitoring.
Finding 11: Policies designed to affect corporate governance
may be justified either because of lack of shareholder information or
because of inadequate shareholder mechanisms to align shareholder
and manager interests. However, it is likely that information about
the risk of a catastrophic spill and individual firm safety cultures will
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increase following the Deepwater Horizon spill, which might reduce
the need for government policies affecting corporate governance.
Finding 12: While evidence suggests that government policies
to improve corporate governance increase firm value (and hence have
social benefit), there is also evidence that they can deter firms from
becoming publicly traded.
Finding 13: Deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico is
conducted by many private and/or publicly traded firms that are not
based in the United States. Thus, government-imposed corporate
governance policies are unlikely to be applied uniformly to all firms
and will raise the cost of drilling for U.S.-based, publicly traded firms
relative to other firms drilling in the Gulf.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In this Part, we develop a series of policy recommendations
designed to improve the safety culture of firms drilling for oil in the
Gulf of Mexico. We focus primarily on the incentive and monitoring
effects of liability caps, FR requirements, and insurance requirements.
A. Liability Caps
Capping liability for damages resulting from oil spills tempers
drilling firms' incentives for strong safety culture. Eliminating
liability caps would force drilling firms to fully internalize the costs of
drilling and fulfill the compensatory goals of liability policy.
Eliminating liability caps may not be politically feasible or
consistent with other policies (e.g., a mandatory insurance
requirement if markets are unable to insure against unlimited
liability). But if we assume there will be a liability cap, then the level
at which it is set remains an important policy choice. The current
federal (OPA) liability cap is $75 million, a figure woefully out of
proportion to the estimated $20 billion to $60 billion in third-party
damages from the Deepwater Horizon spill.208 Given this new
information about the possible size of an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico,
perhaps the simplest option is to raise liability caps to somewhere in
this $20 billion to $60 billion range. This would treat the Deepwater

208. See Tim Webb & Ed Pilkington, BP Faces Extra $60bn in Legal Costs as US Loses
Patience with Gulf Clean-Up, THE GUARDIAN, May 26, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/may/26/bp-extra-60bn-legal-costs?INTCMP=SRCH (suggesting BP could face
up to $60 billion in civil penalties if oil leaked at the highest estimated levels at the time).
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Horizon spill as a worst-case scenario. Although administratively
expedient, this approach has several problems.
First, it is not known whether the Deepwater Horizon spill is
really a worst-case event. The industry says that advances in well
containment and lessons learned make a similar spill unlikely or
impossible, 2 9 but this provides little comfort: the industry apparently
believed that a spill like the Deepwater Horizon spill was impossibleuntil it happened. A new spill could occur under different conditions
with different causes and could create even greater environmental and
economic harm. There are, of course, physical limits to the plausible
size of a spill, but there is little evidence that the Deepwater Horizon
spill (and therefore the damages associated with it) reached those
limits. In short, a liability cap based on Deepwater Horizon damages
might be too low to give firms adequate safety incentives.
On the other hand, there is strong evidence that the Macondo
well was particularly dangerous: it was a high-pressure well in deep
water. 210 The worst-case damages from other wells might be far less.
Setting a uniform cap based on the DeepwaterHorizon damages would
therefore provide little extra benefit 21' for less dangerous wells.
A one-size-fits-all cap calibrated to Deepwater Horizon
damages, therefore, is likely to be a relatively poor solution. A more
considered alternative is to set liability caps individually for each well.
In each case, the cap would correspond to the estimated damages
associated with a worst-case spill. Such an approach would generate
the same incentives to invest in safety as would unlimited liability
(since firms would not invest beyond the level required to prevent or
contain a worst-case spill even if liability were unlimited).
Furthermore, these incentives would be tailored to the conditions of a
given well. For particularly dangerous wells, such as those in very
deep water accessing high-pressure reservoirs, damages estimates

209. See, e.g., Erik Milito, Upstream Dir., Am. Petroleum Inst., Testimony Before the
National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (Aug. 25, 2010),
available at
http://www.api.org/Newsroom/uploadfMilitoTestimony-NationalCommission_
DeepwaterHorizon.pdf ("The system will consist of a new subsea containment assembly, which
will prevent oil from escaping into the water in the event of future deepwater accidents .... The
initial safety and operational response has made us safer, and we intend to build on that.").
210. See, e.g., BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8,at ix ("The deepwater environment is cold,
dark, distant, and under high pressures - and the oil and gas reservoirs, when found, exist at
even higher pressures (thousands of pounds per square inch), compounding the risks if a well
gets out of control. The Deepwater Horizon and Macondo well vividly illustrated all of those very
real risks.").
211. In terms of incentives to invest in safety, a liability cap beyond expected worst-case
damages would still serve to compensate victims in the event that damages exceed estimates.
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might be even higher than the Deepwater Horizon damages. But for
many wells-those in shallower water, for example-the cap would
likely be much lower.
In practice, such a tailored damages cap could operate in a
number of ways. Perhaps most simply, experts could determine
criteria that contribute to risk, such as depth and reservoir pressure.
At the extreme of simplicity, this might result in one cap for shallowwater operations and another for those in deep water.
A more finely tailored approach is possible, however. Firms
already must make estimates of worst-case discharge volumes,
provide detailed response plans, and anticipate the environmental
impacts of a spill as part of the BOEMRE permitting process. 2 12 Key
components of an expert estimate of damages from a worst-case spill
are therefore already available. It should be possible to make such a
calculation for each well and generate individual liability caps. It is
worth noting that this approach is similar to the process a third-party
insurer might use to determine the level of coverage available to a
drilling firm (and the level of associated premiums). Whatever the
source of the relevant information, tailored caps would maintain
safety incentives and may be easier to implement than a uniform cap
or no cap at all.
We note that the liability cap should include all payments to
victims, compensation for natural resource damages, and any
administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions. A final caveat concerns
civil and criminal sanctions. In practice, the public may not be able to
fully recover social damages from the firm, for example, because of
legal costs. Additional government policy intervention is justified in
this case; increasing oversight or allowing criminal sanctions are two
examples of policies that would address this consideration. On the
other hand, if social damages are fully internalized from payments to
victims, then imposing additional sanctions could lead to
213
overdeterrence.

212. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL No. 2010-N06, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
EXPLORATION PLANS, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PLANS, AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS
COORDINATION DOCUMENTS ON THE OCS (2010); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL No. 2010-N10,
STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
DEMONSTRATING ADEQUATE SPILL RESPONSE AND WELL CONTAINMENT RESOURCES (2010).

213. From an optimal deterrence standpoint, the total costs paid by the responsible party
should equal the social damages caused by the spill. While overdeterrence is theoretically
plausible, the evidence for underdeterrence discussed throughout the Article appears stronger.
See generally Krupnick et al., supranote 97.
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B. FinancialResponsibility
The same general arguments regarding the rationale for
raising liability caps apply to FR requirements. If caps are eliminated,
then FR requirements should be raised to at least the level of expected
worst-case damages from a spill. Lower FR requirements would
expose the public to risk that a small firm that causes a large spill
would declare bankruptcy to avoid paying the damages costs. If
liability caps remain, FR requirements should be no lower than
liability limits for the same reason.
The links between liability caps and FR requirements
superficially suggest that the two are equal. However, there are some
grounds for suggesting that FR requirements should be set higher
than liability caps. First, some costs are excluded from the statutory
caps on third-party liability. The most obvious excluded cost is spill
removal, which is explicitly left uncapped in the OPA. 214 Also,
penalties other than third-party liability are a prominent feature of
U.S. law; for example, the Clean Water Act provides for civil penalties,
and criminal liability (including financial settlements made under
threat of such liability) is a powerful tool available to federal and state
2 15
governments seeking compensation for natural resources damages.
A firm whose financial resources are exhausted by third-party
damages would be unable to pay these costs, and a firm that expected
to be constrained in this way would not take the additional
precautions that these forms of liability would otherwise promote.
Second, the OPA currently requires only one demonstration of
FR for any firm, regardless of the number of wells for which it is the
responsible party. 216 FR law therefore assumes that only one spill will
affect a firm at any given time. Although the chances of simultaneous
spills are low, they are not zero. Furthermore, a self-insuring firm's
ability to compensate spill victims does not ensure immediate recovery
after a spill. Therefore, a second spill, even if it occurs some time after
the first, may still exceed a firm's ability to compensate. A FR
requirement greater than that needed to cover a worst-case spill
214. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (2006).
215. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006) (providing criminal penalties for "negligent" or "knowing"
behavior with larger monetary sanctions and the possibility of prison time for individual
offenders); id. § 132 1(b)(6) (authorizing administratively imposed penalties up to $10,000 per day
of violation, not to exceed $125,000); id. § 1321(b)(7) (authorizing judicially imposed sanctions up
to $25,000 per day of violation or an amount up to $1,000 per barrel of oil, with provisions for
these sanctions to be increased up to $3,000 per barrel (and a $100,000 minimum) in instances of
gross negligence or willful misconduct").
216. Oil Pollution Act § 1016(a).
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would provide a cushion for these costs. How much greater this level
should be is a difficult question that depends on estimates of spill
damage and removal costs, the likelihood of events that might cause
multiple spills, 217 and the risk aversion of the public.
We therefore recommend that FR requirements be set at least
as high as liability caps, with some consideration given to yet higher
requirements.
C. Insurance
Firms drilling in deep water should be required to purchase
third-party insurance to cover all cleanup and containment costs as
well as economic and natural resource damages. Similar to the FR
requirement, the level of insurance should be at least as high as the
liability cap, and probably greater. The recommendation that thirdparty insurance be required-as opposed to allowing self-insurance or
captive insurance-is based on an assumption that government
monitoring will not be stringent enough to ensure an adequate level of
safety. If government monitoring is deemed adequate, then allowing
self-insurance or captive insurance might be appropriate. In addition,
as we noted previously, there is concern in the industry that capital
markets will not be adequate to supply third-party insurance to cover
a worst-case scenario. 2 18 Thus, if no third-party insurance product is
available, firms wishing to drill in deep water should be required to
provide proof of FR to the government.
D. Risk-Based Fees
Risk-based fees provide direct incentives for safety culture and
can also be designed to provide monitoring that increases the amount
of information available to the public. Introducing an insurance pool
without risk-based fees could create a significant moral hazard
problem in which the insured firms undertake riskier projects than
they would in the absence of insurance. Risk-based fees can be used in
conjunction with certain other policies, including membership in the
MWCC.

217. Natural disasters and terrorism are examples. The former and (likely) the latter,
however, are explicitly excluded from strict liability under the OPA. See Oil Pollution Act §
1003(a) (excluding acts of God and acts of war from liability). If such an event were to cause
multiple spills, firms would not be liable, and costs-at least under federal law-would be borne
by the public.
218. See supra Part IV.D.2.
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E. CorporateGovernance Reforms
While we believe corporate governance reforms could improve
the safety culture of firms, any such policies will only apply to part of
the industry (U.S. publicly traded firms). Thus, while better disclosure
and corporate governance may indeed improve the safety culture of
firms, we do not believe this is a comprehensive solution. However,
given the huge burden that the Deepwater Horizon spill has placed on
BP shareholders, it is quite possible that shareholder pressure for
voluntary governance reform will play an important role in improving
safety culture at publicly traded firms. We also note that our
recommendations to increase the liability cap and require FR are
likely to bring about corporate governance reforms as boards of
directors seek ways to reduce future liability. In other words,
corporate governance reforms (even if not mandated) might be one of
the mechanisms through which shareholders mitigate their risks if
increased liability and FR requirements are imposed.
F. Summary of Policy Recommendations
This Article examines the role of government in ensuring
safety culture at oil-drilling firms. It presumes that society has
already determined that under "good" safety practices, the benefits of
deepwater drilling outweigh its risks. Liability laws can provide an
economic incentive for firms to adopt and maintain a strong safety
and
government
regulation, monitoring,
culture. Increased
enforcement can reduce the likelihood and magnitude of future spills,
but we believe that this would be inadequate without significant
changes to liability law, FR requirements, and insurance. Therefore,
we provide recommendations on the policies that should be used in
conjunction with stronger government oversight.
All the policies discussed in Part IV have a positive effect on
safety culture. But that does not mean that they can be chosen
independently of one another, as the discussion of policy interactions
in Part IV.F has demonstrated. We therefore provide several
alternative sets of policies that would each have a significant effect on
safety culture.
Our preferred approach is to raise the liability cap to the level
of the social damages expected from the estimated worst-case
discharge from a given well. Firms must already estimate such a
worst-case discharge in the permitting process. This information,
combined with expert damages analysis, would generate a risk-based
damages cap for each well. In combination with setting the liability
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cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill, firms
drilling in deep water should be required to purchase third-party
insurance to cover all cleanup and containment costs and all economic
and natural resource damages arising from a spill. Third-party
insurance not only ensures that victims will be compensated but has
the added benefit of third-party monitoring in the absence of effective
government enforcement capacity.
As discussed above, third-party insurance may not be feasible
in such a liability regime. If third-party insurance is not feasible, then
firms wishing to drill in deep water should be required to provide
proof of FR to the government at a level no smaller than the maximum
liability of a firm's wells. Setting the requirement greater than this
maximum would ensure that the firm can cover costs not included in
the liability cap and the costs if a second major spill occurs.
Finally, we reiterate that risk-based drilling fees should be
used as part of an insurance pool to reduce moral hazard. They could
be used in other contexts as well, such as maintaining MWCC
membership, leasing, and permitting.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill has brought with it renewed
interest in the importance of an organization's "safety culture." While
others have examined the safety cultures of BP and other offshore
drilling companies in the Gulf of Mexico, little attention has been
given to the role of the government in ensuring that firms have a high
safety culture. In this Article, we first explored the theoretical
rationale for potential government policies designed to encourage
firms to adopt a safety culture. We have shown that there are two
potential justifications for government interventions: (1) not all of the
social costs of a spill may be internalized by a firm; and (2) there may
be principal-agent problems within the firm, which could be reduced
by external monitoring. The evidence suggests that both of these
justifications may be valid in the case of offshore oil drilling. Next, we
analyzed five policies that could increase safety culture: increased
liability, FR requirements, government monitoring, mandatory private
insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. We find that although each
policy has a positive effect on safety culture, there are important
differences and interactions that must be considered. In particular,
the latter three policies provide external monitoring. Furthermore,
raising liability caps without mandating insurance or raising FR
requirements would have little effect on the safety culture of small
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firms, since such firms could simply declare bankruptcy in the event of
a large spill.
Our preferred approach is to set a liability cap for each well
equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill and to require third-party
insurance up to the cap. We also consider policies designed to affect
corporate governance such as increased disclosure or mandated board
requirements. However, because these policies would only affect
publicly traded firms and because privately held or government-owned
enterprises undertake substantial drilling, this option would only
have a limited effect-and might have the perverse effect of providing
a cost advantage to the nonpublicly traded firms.

